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Abstract
We conduct an “artefactual” field experiment to incorporate three different risk
preferences measures within the Innovation Panel (IP) of the UK Household Longitu-
dinal Survey (UKHLS). We randomly allocate to an experimental module a nationally
representative sample of 661 adult respondents to the IP Wave 6 (IP6). These sub-
jects respond to the incentive-compatible tasks by Holt and Laury (2002) (HL), and by
Binswanger (1980, 1981) and Eckel and Grossman (2008) (B-EG), and to the SOEP
survey questions by Dohmen et al. (2011) for self-reported willingness to take risks
in general (SOEP-G), in finance (SOEP-F), and in health (SOEP-H). One year later
(IP7) the same measures are repeated for 413 of these respondents. This design al-
lows us to systematically test, for a UK representative sample, the validity of the
three measures along three dimensions. First, we look at cross-validity by testing how
responses at one point in time correlate across the three tasks, assuming a Constant
Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function. Second, we look at temporal sta-
bility by comparing the responses across IP6 and IP7. Third, we look at external
validity by considering a range of risky health and financial behaviors in the UKHLS.
We have three main findings. First, concerning cross-validity, we find evidence that
the different measures generally correlate and map into each other, although their as-
sociations are not perfect. Second, concerning temporal stability, there are significant
and positive correlations of the B-EG, HL, and SOEP measures across IP6 and IP7.
Finally, we find mixed evidence concerning external validity.
Keywords: field experiments; risk aversion; behavioural data linking; health be-
haviors.
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1 Introduction
This study takes a systematic look at the stability and validity of different risk preferences
measures using a longitudinal sample of adults, representative of the UK population.
The stability of risk preferences measures can be assessed at two levels: over time
(temporal stability), and across different elicitation methods (cross-validity).1 Besides
cross-validity, the validity of risk preferences measures can be assessed in terms of external
validity, that is, by looking at the extent to which they associate with, and are able to
predict, a range of field behaviors. We investigate the issue of stability and validity of risk
preferences measures along these three directions.
We conduct an artefactual field experiment (in the sense of Harrison and List, 2004)
with a UK representative sample of adult respondents within the Innovation Panel (IP) of
the UK Household Longitudinal Survey (UKHLS, also known as Understanding Society).
In the sixth wave of the Innovation Panel (IP6) we randomly select a sub-sample of 661
respondents and we elicit their risk preferences using two experimental methods with real
monetary rewards: the multiple price list (MPL) binary-lotteries method by Holt and
Laury (Holt and Laury, 2002; HL), and the ordered lottery sequence method originally
proposed by Binswanger (Binswanger, 1980, 1981), and then applied by Eckel and Gross-
man (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; B-EG). The same individuals are asked to answer the
survey questions incorporated in the German Socio-Economic Panel survey (SOEP) and in
other representative surveys across the world (Rieger et al., 2014; Becker et al., 2015; Josef
et al., 2016). These survey questions record the respondents’ self-reported risk attitudes
in general (SOEP-G), in financial matters (SOEP-F), and in health matters (SOEP-H),
using Likert scales. One year later, in the Innovation Panel wave 7 (IP7) we repeat the
three risk preference measures for 413 of the original participants to the experiment.
The within-subjects design of the experiment allows us to investigate the cross-validity
of the risk preferences measures by comparing, at an individual level, the responses across
the experimental methods - and their implied coefficients of risk aversion - as well as with
the responses to the survey questions.
We then exploit the longitudinal nature of the Innovation Panel to directly look at the
temporal stability of the three different measures of risk preferences.
Finally, we take advantage of the wealth of information provided by the UKHLS data
to systematically assess the external validity of the different measures of risk preferences
with respect to a range of health- and finance-related risky behaviors.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to look jointly and systematically at
the three dimensions of cross-validity, temporal stability, and external validity of two ex-
perimental measures of risk preferences (B-EG and HL) and three risk attitudes questions
(SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and SOEP-H) using a nationally representative sample. Looking sys-
tematically and comprehensively at all the three validity dimensions together is important
1Andersen et al. (2008b) distinguish between conditional stability and unconditional temporal stability:
see Section 2.2 for a more detailed discussion. Another, conceptually distinct, question relates to the issue
of stability of risk preferences across different life domains (domain-specificity): see, for instance, Hanoch
et al. (2006); Barseghyan et al. (2011); Einav et al. (2012), and Galizzi et al. (2016c) for a recent summary
of the literature looking at the domain-specificity of risk preferences.
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because it allows us to draw conclusions on the overall validity of different risk preferences
measures that would otherwise be missed when looking at each aspect in isolation.
When looking at cross-validity, our study is close in design and concept to Dave et al.
(2010), Dohmen et al. (2011), Loomes and Pogrebna (2014), Crosetto and Filippin (2015),
and Vieider et al. (2015b), among other studies, but it is the first to look at two experimen-
tal measures of risk preferences and three risk attitudes questions for a UK representative
sample. Our study, moreover, also looks at the temporal stability of all these measures,
like Andersen et al. (2008a) and Harrison and Lau (2014) do for the HL measure in a
representative sample in Denmark, and Josef et al. (2016) do for the SOEP measures in
a representative sample in Germany. Finally, our study also systematically compares, for
the first time, three different measures of risk preferences in terms of their external validity
using a representative panel of survey respondents. Section 2 reviews these studies, and
the rest of the literature, in greater detail, and discusses how our study builds on the
existing body of evidence on each of the three validity aspects.
We have three main findings. First, concerning cross-validity, the different measures
of risk preferences correlate and map into each other, although their associations are far
from being perfect. In particular, the two experimental measures are correlated to each
other; the HL experimental measure with high monetary stakes is significantly associated
with the survey question about self-reported risk attitude in general, but not with the self-
reported risk attitudes in the financial and health domains; the HL experimental measure
with lower monetary stakes is not correlated with any of the questions on self-reported
risk attitudes; the B-EG experimental measure is instead positively associated to all the
survey questions about risk attitudes.
Second, for what concerns temporal stability, we find that, after one year, less than one
third of the subjects choose the same preferred option in the lottery choices or in the self-
reported risk attitude scales. Nonetheless, there is a significant and positive correlation
between the risk aversion parameters implicit in the lottery choices in IP6 and IP7, as well
as between the self-reported risk attitudes in the two waves. Overall, risk attitudes elicited
through survey questions are more temporally stable than the experimental measures of
risk preferences. Moreover, the parameters of risk aversion implicit in the B-EG and
the HL lottery choices and the self-reported attitudes in IP6 significantly predict the
corresponding risk aversion parameters and self-reported attitudes in IP7.
Third, we find mixed evidence concerning the external validity of the three risk attitude
measures. In particular, none of the three measures is associated with the respondents’
smoking status, their consumption of junk food, their likelihood of regularly saving, or
the time horizons of their savings. The two experimental measures significantly associate
with the subjects’ BMI, whereas none of the survey questions do. Only the HL and the
B-EG measure predict the regular consumption of fruit and vegetables and whether the
respondents have a private pension fund, respectively; on the other hand, only the risk
attitudes survey questions associate with the DOSPERT survey questions for risk-taking
in hypothetical situations in finance and in health, and with heavy alcohol drinking.
Section 2 contains a brief discussion of the background evidence and related literature,
while Section 3 discusses in detail the experimental design, setting, and tasks. Section
4 describes the theoretical framework and outlines the empirical analysis, while Section
2
5 presents the results. Section 6 looks more closely at the “inconsistent” subjects, while
Section 7 briefly concludes.
2 Contribution to the existing literature
2.1 Cross validity
The psychology and economics literatures have developed a multitude of tests to mea-
sure risk attitudes and risk preferences. In psychology, risk attitudes are measured using
the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART, Lejuez et al., 2002) and the Domain-Specific
Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT, Weber et al., 2002; Blais and Weber, 2006). In experi-
mental and behavioral economics, besides the already mentioned B-EG and HL methods,
several other incentive-compatible methods have been proposed to measure risk prefer-
ences (see Cox and Harrison, 2008; Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2008; Charness et al., 2013 for
some recent reviews of the literature). Some examples are the Becker-DeGroot-Marschack
mechanism, the First Price Auction and the Second Price Auction methods (Becker et al.,
1964; Cox et al., 1988; Harrison, 1986, 1990; Isaac and James, 2000); the Allocation Task
(AT) (Loomes, 1991); the Trade-Off Methods (Wakker and Deneffe, 1996; Barsky et al.,
1997; Anderson and Mellor, 2009); the Charness-Gneezy-Potters investment game (Gneezy
and Potters, 1997; Charness and Gneezy, 2010); the Lottery Panel test (Sabater-Grande
and Georgantzis, 2002; Georgantz´ıs and Navarro-Mart´ınez, 2010); and, more recently, the
Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (Crosetto and Filippin, 2013). Besides the HL method, other
multiple price list (MPL) methods have been used, among others, by Harless and Camerer
(1994); Hey and Orme (1994); Loomes and Sugden (1998); Donkers et al. (2001); Harbaugh
et al. (2002, 2010); Harrison et al. (2005c, 2007a); Jacobson and Petrie (2009); Tanaka
et al. (2010); Dohmen et al. (2011); Von Gaudecker et al. (2011); Sutter et al. (2013);
Vieider et al. (2015a).
Despite the multitude of methods to measure risk preferences in lab and field settings,
a relatively limited number of studies have directly looked at how these different measures
correlate and map into each other, and the vast majority of these studies have considered
student samples.
Table 1 summarizes the main features and findings of the existing studies that look at
the cross-validity of different measures of risk preferences at one point in time.2 With the
exception of Dohmen et al. (2011) and Josef et al. (2016), no study has considered repre-
sentative samples of the population to investigate cross-validity. Moreover, both Dohmen
et al. (2011) and Josef et al. (2016) focus on the association between an experimental
MPL measure (which is different from the HL method), and the self-reported willingness
to take risk in general (SOEP-G).
The state-of-the-art evidence on the cross-validity is somewhat mixed and not conclu-
sive. Among the studies that consider university student samples, Becker et al. (2015)
compare SOEP measures with responses to MPL tests with real and hypothetical rewards
and find significant correlations. The rest of the cross-validity studies conducted with
2All tables are reported in Appendix A.
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student samples, however, provide more mixed evidence. Deck et al. (2013), for example,
compare the HL test with a different experimental task based on the “Deal or no deal”
game show, as well as with a survey measure, and find inconsistent responses across the
methods, with most correlation coefficients being not statistically significant. Loomes and
Pogrebna (2014) compare responses to the AT, B-EG, and HL tasks and find no correlation
between any of them. Further evidence of imperfectly mapping responses across different
methods to measure risk preferences in student samples has also been provided by Isaac
and James (2000), Anderson and Mellor (2009), Reynaud and Couture (2012), Dulleck
et al. (2013), Vieider et al. (2015b), and Attanasi et al. (2016) using a within-subject
design, and by Crosetto and Filippin (2013) using a between-subject design. Dave et al.
(2010) consider a general population sample in Canada, and compare responses across the
B-EG and HL methods using experimental tasks that are similar to the ones we use: they
find significantly higher risk aversion in the HL than in the B-EG task.3
As mentioned, only two cross-validity studies to date have considered representative
samples of the population, both in Germany: Dohmen et al. (2011) and Josef et al. (2016)
compare responses to an incentive-compatible MPL test with the SOEP-G measure for
risk attitudes in general, and find small but significant associations.
We contribute to these existing studies by systematically assessing the cross-validity
between two different state-of-the-art experimental measures of risk preferences (B-EG
and HL) and three risk attitudes questions (SOEP-G, SOEP-F and SOEP-H), considering
a representative sample of the UK adult population.
2.2 Temporal stability
Most of the existing evidence on the temporal stability4 of experimental measures of risk
preferences comes from studies with small, unrepresentative samples.5 Evidence from
larger samples and/or over longer periods of time is available for survey measures of risk
attitudes or hypothetical gambles (e.g. Sahm, 2012; Guiso et al., 2013; Hoffmann et al.,
2013; Josef et al., 2016). Recent reviews of the main studies assessing the temporal stability
3Evidence of imperfect mapping of risk preferences measures has also been provided by Charness and
Viceisza (2015), considering a convenience sample in rural Senegal.
4Concerning temporal stability, Andersen et al. (2008b) distinguish between unconditional and condi-
tional stability of risk preferences. Unconditional stability postulates that risk aversion literally remains
constant over time. According to conditional stability, what remains constant over time is the function
that links the risk aversion with the observable states of nature. Conditional stability is thus a weaker
concept of stability of risk preferences. Conditionally temporally stable preferences are component of a
broader approach often referred to as “state-dependent preferences” (Karni, 1983, 1987, 1993; Karni et al.,
1983; Viscusi and Evans, 1990; Evans and Viscusi, 1991; Chambers and Quiggin, 2000).
5 For instance, 30 students at Harvard University over a period of 10 weeks in Mosteller and Nogee
(1951); 23 US farmers over a period of 2 years in Love and Robison (1984); 84 US businessmen over a
period of 1 year in Wehrung et al. (1984); 80 students at University of York over a period of a week to 10
days in Hey and Orme (1994); 253 farmers in the Netherlands over a period of 1 year in Smidts (1997); 31
students at University of South Carolina over a period of 6 months in (Harrison et al., 2005b); 69 students
at UCL over a period of 3 months in Vlaev et al. (2009); 141 MBA students at IESE Business School over
a period of 3 months in (Baucells and Villas´ıs, 2010); 73 undergraduate students at University of Munster
over a period of 1 month in Zeisberger et al. (2012); 53 graduate students at University of Maastricht over
a period of 5-10 weeks in Wo¨lbert and Riedl (2013).
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of risk preferences can be found in Zeisberger et al. (2012), and Chuang and Schechter
(2015).
Three prominent studies in temporal stability of risk preferences in representative sam-
ples are the longitudinal studies by Andersen et al. (2008b), Harrison and Lau (2014), and
Josef et al. (2016). Andersen et al. (2008b) measure risk preferences for a representative
sample of 253 Danes using the HL method, and revisit 97 of them in four occasions, at a
distance of up to 17 months after, and find that risk preferences are state contingent with
respect to personal finances but are not changing over time. Josef et al. (2016) look at
test-retest correlations for the SOEP survey questions in a large representative survey in
Germany (around 11,000 subjects) over a period of up to ten years, and find moderate to
high correlations (in a range of 0.42-0.58). The longitudinal artefactual field experiment
by Harrison and Lau (2014) measure risk preferences for a representative sample of 413
Danes using the HL method and, one year after, repeat the same HL measures for 182
of those same subjects: once their structural estimations make full corrections for sample
selection and attrition, they find evidence of temporal stability of risk preferences
With respect to this existing literature, our study considers a representative sample
of the UK adult population to look systematically at the temporal stability of a battery
of risk preferences measures, including two different experimental measures and three risk
attitudes questions.
2.3 External validity
Concerning external validity, a large number of previous studies have looked at the asso-
ciations between experimental measures for risk preferences and individual behaviors in
a variety of contexts, from health to finance, from job choices to environmental behavior.
A systematic review of this literature is beyond the scope of this study, but also on this
third dimension the evidence to date is mixed and not conclusive.
Consider, for instance, a risky health behavior which is usually assumed to be as-
sociated with risk preferences: smoking behavior. A recent review of the literature on
this topic can be found in Harrison et al. (2015a) and reveals that some studies find a
significant association between smoking status and risk preferences (Reynolds, 2006; An-
derson and Mellor, 2008), although the effect is often marginally significant, not robust
to changes in the definition of smoker, or counterintuitive (i.e. smokers being more risk
averse) (Reynolds, 2004, 2006). There is, however, an equal (if not larger) number of
studies that find no significant association between risk preferences and smoking status
(Yi et al., 2007; Reynolds et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 2010; Mitchell, 1999; Galizzi and
Miraldo, 2012; Szrek et al., 2012; Harrison et al., 2015a).
Similar mixed results are common for other risky behaviors. Most studies on the
external validity of risk preferences measures, moreover, consider student samples and
focus on one specific measure of risk preferences and one specific behavior at a time.
We contribute to the existing literature on the external validity of risk preference
measures by systematically comparing two experimental measures (B-EG and HL) and
three self-reported indicators (SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and SOEP-H) against a comprehensive
range of behaviors for a representative sample of the UK adult population. The importance
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of systematic analyses to assess the external validity of experimental measures is discussed
in great detail in Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez (2015) in the context of social preferences
games.
3 Experiments
3.1 The Innovation Panel of the UK Household Longitudinal Survey
The artefactual field experiment was conducted using the UK Household Longitudinal
Survey (UKHLS, also known as Understanding Society), a survey funded by the Economic
and Social Research Council (ESRC) and managed by the Institute for Social and Eco-
nomic Research (ISER) at the University of Essex. The UKHLS is the largest multi-topic
household panel survey in the world, interviewing annually more than 40,000 respondents
(see www.understandingsociety.ac.uk). The UKHLS also includes the Innovation Panel
(IP), a parallel longitudinal survey of about 1,500 households, whose questionnaire con-
tent mirrors that of the larger survey, but it is explicitly designed “for experimental and
methodological research relevant for longitudinal surveys” (Jackle et al., 2015).
Like the UKHLS, the IP has a stratified and geographically clustered sample design
(Lynn, 2009). It provides a representative sample of the population of England, Scotland,
and Wales, but (unlike the main Understanding Society survey) excludes Northern Ireland
and Scotland areas north of the Caledonian Canal. Post code sectors from the Postcode
Address File were used as primary sampling units (PSUs) and stratified by Government
Office Region (GOR). Respondents to the IP routinely take part in randomized controlled
experiments. In years 2012 to 2014 (i.e. in IP5 to IP7) the main experimental intervention
focused on the use of web interviewing, which has the potential of enhancing response
rates and fieldwork efficiency while at the same time reducing survey costs. A detailed
description of the experiments conducted in IP5-7 can be found in Jackle et al. (2015).
Appendix B describes in greater detail the sampling design of the IP; the sampling weights
that are used in all the estimations presented in the rest of the paper; and the random
assignment of the households to either face-to-face (F2F) or web (WEB) interview mode.
3.2 Allocation to the risk preferences module
In IP6 a total of n = 1,087 sampled households were randomly allocated to the risk pref-
erences elicitation module, independently from the (randomly) allocated interview mode.
The sample included members of the Wave 4 refreshment sample and original sample
members (OSMs) for which a longer longitudinal panel was available. Due to survey
non-participation, the final sample of households eligible for the experimental module was
n = 808, of which 528 (65.3%) randomly allocated to the WEB mode. In each eligible
household, one adult respondent was then randomly selected using a Kish grid to answer
the risk preferences module. A total of 661 respondents completed the risk preferences
module in IP6, and 468 did it one year later, in IP7. A total of 413 individuals answered
the risk preferences questions in both IP6 and IP7. Appendix C describes the details of
the allocation to the risk preferences module.
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The implementation of the risk preferences experimental tests in IP6 was programmed
and piloted, in both interview modes, in January 2013. In the same month, professional
interviewers from the National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) were selected and
trained for the fieldwork. The data collection of the experimental tests in IP6 took place
between February and July 2013. The data collection of the experimental tests in IP7
took place between May and November 2014.
3.3 Experimental and survey questions on risk preferences in the UKHLS
Innovation Panel
The participants in the experimental module were presented three tasks. The first task
was to measure time preferences and is fully described in Galizzi et al. (2016b). The
second identified a-temporal risk preferences using both the HL and the B-EG methods.
These two tasks took place at the beginning of the individual survey. The third task
consisted of an ad hoc questionnaire conducted after all the standard modules of the
UKHLS, containing the SOEP survey questions on risk attitudes, and other behavioral
dimensions of interest.
3.3.1 Experimental design considerations
In designing the risk preferences questions (and more generally the experimental module)
a number of considerations and constraints were taken into account. The most pressing
constraint was the desire to keep the overall burden of the experimental module to a
minimum in order to minimize respondents’ fatigue, non-response, and attrition. Given
the available research budget, the entire experimental module was allocated an indicative
time slot of about fifteen minutes, which substantially limited the number of questions
that could be introduced.6 Given that the estimation of the various time preferences
models required relatively more data points, the module was designed with the idea that
about 20 questions were allocated to risk preferences.
The second overall design consideration was the importance of presenting to subjects
the different risk tradeoffs in a transparent and easily accessible way. This aspect is of
great importance in our representative sample of respondents, given their inherent hetero-
geneity in socio-demographic conditions, education levels, numeracy, cognitive skills, and
familiarity with similar tasks. We thus opted for the HL MPL test, the B-EG ordered
lotteries sequence method, and the SOEP risk attitude measures which have been widely
adopted in the experimental and behavioral economics literature, and have been suc-
cessfully employed with general and representative samples of the population in Canada,
Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and Vietnam, among other countries (Donkers et al.,
2001; Andersen et al., 2008b; Dave et al., 2010; Tanaka et al., 2010; Dohmen et al., 2011;
Von Gaudecker et al., 2011), among other countries.
6There was no binding time limit to answer the experimental questions, though, and subjects were able
to answer each question at their own pace. We also have access to meta-data on individual response times
for each experimental question, and in fact we use these data in the structural estimations of risk and time
preferences in the companion papers (Galizzi et al., 2016b,a).
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Risk preferences HL questions consisted of two subsequent blocks of binary choices, the
first block of 9 questions referring to relatively low monetary stakes, while the second block
of 9 questions presenting options with relatively high monetary outcomes. To maximize
clarity and transparency, in each block the list of binary choices was presented in an
ordered manner with the probability of the high prize increasing in 0.1 increments (see
more below). In both the WEB and F2F response modes each question was presented in
a separate screen and the subjects had to confirm their answers before moving to the next
screen.
A last question was introduced to measure risk preferences using the B-EG ordered
lottery sequence method (see more below). Subjects responded to these risk preferences
after having answered the time preferences questions.
To further encourage clarity and transparency of the procedure, and to ensure that
subjects understood the consequences of their choices, the risk preferences module started
with a preamble which briefly described the tasks, the aim of the experiment, and high-
lighted that their possible gains were related to their actual choices (see the Appendix D
for details).
The third overall design consideration revolved around the exact level of the monetary
stakes to be used in the incentive-compatible tests. Understanding Society respondents are
accustomed to fixed-fees incentives in the region of £5-10. In order to genuinely elicit risk
preferences for our heterogeneous set of respondents, we had to make monetary outcomes
salient.
Moreover, we faced a trade-off between the simultaneous needs of making the monetary
outcomes salient, and diversifying the range of monetary stakes in the attempt to capture
possible cases of risk preference depending on the absolute value of the monetary stakes
(for instance, being risk averse for low amounts, but risk loving for high amounts, or the
other way around: Hey and Orme, 1994; Harrison et al., 2005a; Holt and Laury, 2005; Cox
and Sadiraj, 2006; Cox et al., 2015). Due to the binding time constraint, we opted for two
MPL series of HL questions with the following prize sets: [A1: £40 and £32; B1: £77 and
£2], [A2: £100 and £40; B2: £180 and £2]. That is, a first series of 9 binary questions
used relatively low monetary stakes, with a safer lottery giving outcomes of £32-£40, and
the other risky lottery returning payments of £2-£77. A second series asked 9 binary
questions with relatively high monetary stakes, with a safer lottery giving out payments
of £40-£100, and the other risky lottery returning payments of £2-£180.
The multiple-options B-EG test was implemented in a version with a somewhat lower
level of monetary stakes: the prize sets were [A1: £28; A2: £28], [B1: £24; B2: £36],
[C1: £20; C2: £44], [D1: £16; D2: £52], [E1: £12, E2: £60], [F1: £2; F2: £70].
A fourth, related, overall design consideration concerned the choice of how to adminis-
ter the experimental tests and to pay out the chosen options. Given the relatively limited
budget constraint, the use of salient monetary outcomes did not allow paying out all the
experimental tests for all subjects. We thus randomly select one of the experimental tasks
for being actually played for real, and for giving each subject one in ten chances to receive
the associated payment. Although it is well known that such a procedure transforms the
experimental tasks into a compound-lottery (Holt, 1986), it is a common belief among ex-
perimental economists that this procedure does not interfere with the genuine elicitation
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of individual risk preferences.7
Another issue was that the payment procedures used to play the experimental tests
should be familiar and credible to the respondents. Respondents to the Understanding
Society IP are accustomed to receive monetary incentives. Credibility of monetary pay-
ments was thus not an issue. What respondents were relatively less familiar with was
the administration of randomized payments. Randomized payments were administered by
means of an ad hoc computerized script, which visualized the probability to be among the
respondents to be paid, the random selection of the question which determined the payoff
function, and the random outcome of the selected lottery. Appendix E describes the ran-
domization procedure. The gains were paid in form of vouchers that could be redeemed
both online and at a large number of supermarkets and high street shops all over the UK.
3.3.2 The HL and B-EG tests in detail
In this section we provide a more detailed description of the HL and B-EG task.
Subjects in both the F2F and the WEB mode answered the same questions in the same
frame, with a single question presented at a time in a separate screen. Questions in the
first block of 9 HL questions with relatively low monetary stakes (low) were presented first,
followed by questions in a second block of 9 HL questions with relatively high monetary
payments (high). Within each block of questions, choices were presented in an ordered
manner, with the probability of the high prize increasing in 0.1 increments. Unlike Hey
and Orme (1994) we did not use any pie chart showing prizes and probabilities. The
typical wording of the risk preferences questions was as follows:
Between Lottery A and Lottery B, which lottery do you prefer?
Options:
LOTTERY A: Winning £40 with a 1 in 10 chance (i.e., die roll is 1), and £32 with a
9 in 10 chance (i.e., die roll is 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 or 10)
LOTTERY B: Winning £77 with a 1 in 10 chance (i.e., die roll is 1), and £2 with a
9 in 10 chance (i.e., die roll is 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9 or 10)
Table 2 shows the specific values of the lottery stakes and probabilities from the HL
questions.
The B-EG task required the subjects choosing between 6 lotteries: A, B, C, D, E and
F. Each lottery gave a 50% chance of receiving a low cash payment and a 50% chance of a
high cash payment. The payments for the lotteries were: A: low = £28, high = £28; B: low
= £24, high = £36; C: low = £20, high = £44; D: low = £16, high = £52; E: low = £12,
high = £60; F: low = £2, high = £70. Table 3 shows the B-EG lotteries. These choices
were thus increasing in the variance of the outcomes and in the risk they represented, with
7See for instance Conlisk (1989); Starmer and Sugden (1991); Wilcox (1993); Bernasconi (1994); Beattie
and Loomes (1997); Cubitt et al. (1998); Harrison et al. (2002); Drehmann et al. (2005); Harrison et al.
(2007b); Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008). See Baltussen et al. (2012), Harrison and Swarthout (2014), Cox
et al. (2015), Harrison et al. (2015b), and March et al. (2016) for some recent studies looking more closely
at the random lottery incentive mechanism.
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A being the safe choice (a guaranteed payment of £28 and thus a variance of σ2A = 0)
and F the highest-risk choice (a variance of σ2F = 1156). To make a choice, a subject
chooses one out of the six lotteries. The B-EG measure thus increases with an individual’s
appetite for risk. It is worthwhile to notice that any subject risk neutral or risk averse
should always prefer lottery E to lottery F. This is because, by construction, lottery E has
the same expected value of lottery F (equal to £36 in both cases) but smaller variance.
3.3.3 Questionnaire
The questionnaire included survey questions on self-reported risk attitudes and other re-
lated behavioral attitudes of interest. We included a question about self-reported attitude
towards risk-taking in general (Dohmen et al., 2011), taking values from 0 (“I am generally
a person unwilling to take risks”) to 10 (“I am generally a person fully prepared to take
risks”) (SOEP-G); a question about self-reported attitude towards risk-taking in health,
taking values from 0 (“I am generally a person unwilling to take risks in health”) to 10
(“I am generally a person fully prepared to take risks in health”) (SOEP-H); as well as
a question about self-reported attitude towards risk-taking in financial matters, taking
values from 0 (“I am generally a person unwilling to take risks in financial matters”) to 10
(“I am generally a person fully prepared to take risks in financial matters”) (SOEP-F).8
In addition to these variables from the questionnaire, in our analysis we use a number
of variables from the main IP survey. In the analysis reported here we use individual
and household characteristics of the respondents such as: household per-capita income
(PCIncome); family size (FamSize); respondents’ age (Age), gender (Female), and marital
status (Married); dummy variables for whether the respondents are employees (Empl), self-
employees (SelfEmpl) or unemployed (Unempl); for whether they have achieved at least
an upper secondary school degree (ALevel); for whether they report to smoke (Smoker),
drink more than 5 alcohol units in the last four weeks (Heavy Drinking); for whether the
respondents answer the survey in the WEB mode (Web).
We also use some wave-specific variables that are only available in either IP6 or IP7.
For instance, in IP6 the height and weight of the respondents were directly measured,
which allows us to calculate the subjects’ body mass index (BMI). In IP6, moreover, there
are variables for the weekly consumption of junk food (Junk Food), as well as dummy
variables for whether the subjects are regular savers (RegularSaver), have a private pension
fund (PrivatePension), and a categorical variable for the allocation of the savings between
short and long term (Savings Horizon).
In IP7 there is a variable for the weekly consumption of fruit and vegetables (Fruit
and Vegetables), and we have also included a simplified version of the DOSPERT test
for risk-taking in hypothetical domain-specific situations. The DOSPERT questions ask
respondents to self-report how likely they are to engage in a series of specific activities
or behaviors, using a 7-points Likert scale, taking value from 1 (“Extremely unlikely”)
to 7 (“Extremely likely”). In particular, to ensure comparability with the SOEP-F and
the SOEP-H questions we have introduced six finance-related and six health-related hy-
pothetical questions. They ask IP7 respondents what is the likelihood of: betting a day’s
8The questions are shown in Appendix F.
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income at the horse race (Bet: horses); investing 10% of their annual income in a moderate
growth mutual fund (Invest 10%: mutual fund); betting a day’s income at a high-stake
poker game (Bet: poker game); investing 5% of their annual income in a very speculative
stock (Invest 5%: speculation); betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event
(Bet: sports); investing 10% of their annual income in a new business venture (Invest
10%: business); drinking heavily at a social function (Drink heavily: social); engaging
in unprotected sex (Unprotected sex); driving a car without wearing a seat belt (Drive
w/o seatbelt); riding a motorcycle without a helmet (Motorcycle w/o helmet); sunbathing
without sunscreen (No sunscreen); and walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of
the town (Walk home alone unsafe). Following the literature (Weber et al 2002, Blais &
Weber, 2006), we aggregate the responses to the DOSPERT questions in two summary
indexes for risk taking in health and in finance. The full set of questions is available in
Appendix F. Some descriptive statistics for the main variables above in our sample are
reported in Section 5.1 and Table 4.
4 Theoretical framework and empirical analysis
In Section 5.1 we first present results in terms of raw choices in the different tasks. In
particular, in the B-EG task, we report the proportions of subjects who chose the different
lotteries, from lottery A to lottery F. Similarly, in the HL we report the proportions of
subjects who switch for the first time from lottery A to lottery B in correspondence of each
HL question in the sequence of pairwise choices, from 1 (choosing for the first time the
riskier lottery B when p = 0.1) to 2 (choosing the riskier lottery B when p = 0.2) and so
forth, up to 10 (never choosing the riskier lottery B). In the SOEP task, the self-reported
attitude towards risk-taking takes values from 0 (“I am generally a person unwilling to
take risks”) to 10 (“I am generally a person fully prepared to take risks”).
The different tasks point to a subject’s appetite for risk into different directions. The
higher is the first switching point in the HL task, in fact, the higher is the subject’s risk
aversion. The higher is the SOEP score, however, the higher is the subject’s risk taking
attitude. Similarly, in the B-EG task the subject is less risk averse when moves from
lottery A (the certain gamble) to lottery F (the riskiest gamble). Thus, while the risk
aversion increases with the raw choices in HL task, risk aversion decreases with the lottery
choices in the B-EG task, and risk taking attitude increases with the Likert scale point in
the SOEP tasks.
In order to compare the three measures in a meaningful and intuitive way, we therefore
reverse-code the responses to the B-EG and the SOEP tasks, so that all the three tasks
increase with risk aversion and decrease with risk taking. In Sections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 we
present the pairwise correlations, and the statistics about the cross-validity and the tem-
poral stability of the B-EG, HL, and SOEP tasks, respectively, in terms of these recoded
measures increasing with risk aversion and decreasing with risk taking. In particular, we
define HL RA as an increasing measure of risk aversion according to the HL task, that is
increasing with the point in which the subject switches for the first time from lottery A
to lottery B in the sequence of the HL questions, taking values from 1 (choosing for the
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first time the riskier lottery B when p = 0.1) to 2 (choosing the riskier lottery B when
p = 0.2) and so forth, up to 10 (never choosing the riskier lottery B). We define B-EG RA
as an increasing measure of risk aversion according to the B-EG task, taking values from 1
(very risk seeking) if the subject chooses lottery F (the riskiest gamble) in the B-EG task,
to 6 (very risk averse) if the subject chooses lottery A (the certain gamble) in the B-EG
task. Similarly, we define SOEP-G RA as a decreasing measure of risk taking attitude
according to the SOEP-G task, taking value from 1 (willing to take risk) if the subject
chooses to 10 in the SOEP-G Likert scale (“I am generally a person fully prepared to take
risks”), to value 10 (unwilling to take risks) if the subject chooses 0 in the SOEP-G Likert
scale (“I am generally a person unwilling to take risks”). We equivalently define SOEP-F
RA and SOEP-H RA with the corresponding meaning of risk taking attitudes in finance
and in health, respectively. It is expected therefore that the pairwise correlations between
the B-EG RA, HL RA and SOEP RA measures are positive, and that the three measures
cross-validate each other in the same direction.
Notice that focusing on correlations without a detailed cross-tabulation of the choices
can be misleading. For example, correlations could not capture the fact that, regardless
of what they choose in the B-EG task, many subjects in the HL task either switch imme-
diately to lottery B or never switch to lottery B. There is, moreover, a key issue related
to expressing risk aversion simply as a mere linear function of the first switching point in
the series of the HL questions or of the lottery choice in the B-EG task. The problem is,
clearly, that subjects’ risk aversion is a non-linear function of the switching points in the
HL questions and of the lottery choice in the B-EG task. We need therefore to map the
choices in the HL and the B-EG tasks into risk aversion parameters within a theoretical
framework, like in Loomes and Pogrebna (2014) and Crosetto and Filippin (2015).
In the rest of the analysis, we assume that EUT holds for choices over risky options.9
We imagine that subjects use some utility function U(·) that is separable and stationary
over time. In particular, following a broad economics literature (e.g Wakker, 2008), we
assume that subjects use a CRRA utility function
U(Mτ ,W ) =
(W +Mτ )
(1−r)
1− r (1)
for r 6= 1, where r is the CRRA coefficient, and W is the individual level of background
income within which the monetary prize M is integrated. For r = 1, U(Mτ ) = ln(W+Mτ )
can be assumed if needed. Within this CRRA functional form, r = 0 implies risk-neutral
choices, r > 0 denotes risk aversion, and r < 0 implies risk-seeking behavior. Here we
assume that W = 0 for all subjects. The role of heterogeneous individual-specific levels
of background income and of its possible integration with the B-EG and HL experimental
prizes on the estimation of risk preferences is explored in a companion paper (Galizzi
et al., 2016a).
9We do not consider here the question of whether EUT is the most accurate model for risk preferences.
Rather, this standard model of risk preferences can be viewed descriptively as a convenient statistics to
study the validity and stability of individual responses to different risk preferences measures. Our data, in
fact, allows us to estimate also non-EUT models of risk preferences such as the Rank Dependent Utility
model by Quiggin (1982), a possibility that it is explored by Galizzi et al. (2016b).
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Assuming EUT and CRRA (and assuming that the experimental prizes are integrated
in a background income equal to zero) the coefficient of relative risk aversion associated
to each switching point in the HL task is described by the intervals reported in the right-
most column in Table 2. As it can be seen the relation between coefficients of relative risk
aversion and switching points in the HL task is indeed non-linear.
Similarly, under the same assumptions, the coefficient of relative risk aversion associ-
ated to each lottery choice in the B-EG task is described by the intervals reported in the
right-most column of Table 3. Also in this case the relation between the coefficients of
relative risk aversion and the lottery choices in the B-EG task is non-linear.
To associate the observed lottery choices to an appropriate level of relative risk aver-
sion, we run a set of interval regressions for the B-EG and the HL tasks using as intervals
the lower and upper bounds of relative risk aversion [rl, ru] consistent with the EUT and
CRRA assumptions reported in Tables 2 and 3. This allows us to provide an estimate
of E[r∗|rl < r∗ ≤ ru;X], where r∗ is the latent relative risk aversion, and X is a set of
observed characteristics of the respondents, and rl and ru are the lower and upper bound
consistent with the actual choices in the B-EG and HL tasks (Section 5.4.4). We use these
estimated values in the assessment of the cross-validity, temporal stability, and external
validity of the risk preferences measures (Sections 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6, respectively).
In Section 5.6 we conduct a systematic external validity analysis to predict a range of
health and financial behaviours using as predictors the SOEP measures of risk attitude,
the CRRA values conditional to the specific lottery choice in the B-EG task estimated by
the above interval regressions, and the CRRA values conditional to the specific switching
point in the HL task estimated by the above interval regressions.
All the cross-validity, temporal stability, and external validity regressions have been
replicated using a comprehensive set of alternative models and specifications using either
the raw lottery choices and switching points, or the midpoints of the associated intervals
of the CRRA, or the estimated values described above.
In particular, we have associated each interval of CRRA values associated to a switch-
ing point in HL - or a lottery choice in B-EG - to the midpoint of that CRRA interval.
The midpoints can be easily calculated for the closed-end CRRA ranges corresponding to
the switching points 2 through 9 in the HL tasks and to the lottery choices B to E in the
B-EG task. Fitted values can be estimated for the midpoints of the open-ended intervals
in the B-EG and HL tasks.
All estimations allow for the complex survey design, use appropriate sampling weights
to draw valid inference for the adult population in the UK, and adjust standard errors at
strata and PSU levels. In all the cross-validity, temporal stability, and external validity
regressions, we have found the same patterns of significant associations across these sets
of regressions using the raw responses, the midpoints of the CRRA intervals, and the
estimated CRRA values described above. We therefore report the results for the interval
regressions estimations, while the results of all further cross-validity, temporal stability,
and external validity regressions using the raw responses and the CRRA midpoints are
available on request.
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5 Results
We first present some simple descriptive statistics for the respondents in our UK represen-
tative sample (5.1). We then describe the subjects’ responses to the B-EG, HL, and the
SOEP tasks in IP6, in IP7, and by comparing responses in IP6 and IP7 (5.2). We next
present some pairwise correlations among the B-EG and HL measures of risk aversion,
and the SOEP risk attitudes measures (5.3). We then directly deal with each of the three
issues of cross-validity (5.4), temporal stability (5.5), and external validity (5.6) of the
three risk preferences measures.
Although 808 households in the IP were randomly assigned to the experimental module,
only 661 eligible respondents actually answered the risk and time preferences questions,
and they could not be representative of the UK population. Therefore, in order to adjust
for differential attrition and non-response and to generalize results to the UK adult pop-
ulation, all the statistics and the estimations allow for the complex survey design using
the appropriate sampling weights to draw valid inference for the adult population in the
UK, and adjust standard errors at strata and PSU levels. Moreover, when we use the
panel component to compare responses across the two waves and to look at the temporal
stability, we use longitudinal sampling weights that adjust for attrition.
5.1 Descriptive statistics
The main characteristics of our sample in IP6 are reported in Table 4 in Appendix A. The
top half of the table reports the descriptive statistics of all the respondents who answered
the risk preferences questions in IP6. Using sampling weights reduces the number of
observations because in IP6 and IP7 some respondents received a zero cross-sectional
weight, namely the respondents in the households containing no original sample members
with a non-zero longitudinal weight (Jackle et al., 2015). The bottom half reports the
descriptive statistics only for the respondents in IP6 who answered the risk preferences
questions in both IP6 and IP7.
As it can be seen, 52.8% percent of all the IP6 respondents were female, and 43.6%
were married. The average age was 49.47 years old. About 41.7% of the respondents
had at least an A-level education qualification (that is, have obtained at least an upper
secondary school degree). The average level of gross household per capita monthly income
was of £1,966. About 3.9% of respondents were unemployed and around 33.1% participate
to the survey via WEB.
The subjects who answered the risk preferences questions in both IP6 and IP7 had
substantially similar characteristics to the ones described above, with the main differences
being that, on average, they were younger (47.53% years old, on average), had higher
monthly income (£2,124), were more likely to be married (53%) or employees (53% com-
pared to 45.6% in IP6), to have an A-level qualification (47.6%), or to respond to the
survey via WEB (38.2%).
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5.2 Responses
5.2.1 Responses in IP6
Figure 1 reports the histograms of the raw responses in the HL, B-EG and SOEP tasks.
Concerning the HL task, it is generally expected that respondents should be consistent
with their choices. In other words, once in the sequence of HL questions they have chosen
lottery B, they should not choose lottery A in any of the following questions, where the
expected value of the lottery B further increases, that is, they should not “switch back”
to A.
A common finding in the lab and field experiments that do not force consistency in
individual responses, is that a conspicuous proportion of subjects make “inconsistent”
sequences of binary choices in the sense that, after having chosen lottery B, they “switch
back” to lottery A. Crosetto and Filippin (2015) present a meta-analysis of 30 published
experiments conducted using the HL method, involving 4,726 participants, mostly uni-
versity students. They show that, on average, about 16.3% of the experimental subjects
make inconsistent choices, with the proportion being higher in the few experiments con-
ducted with more general samples of the population.10 Responses in our sample are not
an exception to this general finding.
First, a total of 657 subjects started answering the risk preferences questions. Because
two subjects did not complete the HL questions with low monetary stakes and another
subject did not complete the HL questions with high monetary stakes, a total of 655 and
654 subjects answered the HL questions with low and high monetary stakes, respectively.
Among the 655 subjects who answered the HL questions with low monetary stakes, 160
subjects (24.43% of the sample) made at least one inconsistent choice when answering HL
questions with low monetary stakes. Among the 654 subjects who started answering HL
questions with high monetary stakes, 126 subjects (19.26% of the sample) made at least
one inconsistent choice when answering HL questions with high monetary stakes. There
is a core group of 80 respondents who made at least one inconsistent choice in both the
low and the high monetary stakes HL questions.
In what follows, we separately present results for the whole sample of respondents, and
focusing only on the group of the “consistent” subjects who never behaved inconsistently
in the HL questions in IP6. There is a total of 206 subjects who behaved inconsistently
at least once in IP6, in the sense that they switched back to lottery A after choosing
lottery B at least once in the HL task. In Section 6 we look more closely to the subjects
who behaved only “locally” inconsistently in the sense that they made only one “mistake”
in the sequence of HL choices, but their choices were otherwise consistent. In Section 6
we pool these locally inconsistent subjects together with the consistent subjects to see
whether it makes any difference in the estimations. It turns out that it does not.
Table 5 reports the number of subjects who chose lottery B for the first time in corre-
spondence of each HL question, also splitting the sample into consistent and inconsistent
subjects in the HL tasks with low and high monetary stakes in IP6 and IP7.
10Charness and Viceisza (2015) review the studies using the HL task in developing countries and find
higher proportions of inconsistent subjects, between 14% and 66.5% of the subjects.
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Furthermore, by looking at the point in the sequence where the respondent switches
from lottery A to lottery B, one can calculate the lower and upper bounds of the underlying
relative risk aversion parameter r under the EUT and the CRRA assumptions (Section
4).
When looking at the number of safe choices in the HL task for all subjects together,
including the inconsistent (Table 6, All subjects), it can be seen that about a fifth of
the respondents never chose the safe lottery A: 17.71% always chose lottery B with low
monetary stakes, while 23.39% always chose lottery B with high stakes. On the other
hand, a roughly equal proportion of subjects always chose the safer lottery A in all series
of choices (21.07% and 19.42% with low and high monetary stakes, respectively). Apart
from these two polar choices, the distributions of responses to the HL tasks is uni-modal
and roughly symmetric, with the bulk of subjects choosing lottery A between three and
six times in the series of choices.
The responses are more polarized when looking at the 495 and 528 subjects who never
switched back in the HL questions with low and high stakes, respectively, thus excluding
the 160 and 126 inconsistent respondents, respectively (Table 6, Consistent). Between
a fourth and a third of these respondents never chose the safer lottery A (23.43% and
28.98% with low and high monetary stakes, respectively).
In IP6 our sample of respondents provided heterogeneous responses also in the B-EG
task (Table 7). More than a third of the 655 subjects who answered the B-EG task (n=230,
35.11% of the respondents) chose lottery A, the certain gamble, in the B-EG task. The
riskiest gamble, lottery F, was chosen by 104 subjects, 15.88% of the total. A total of 120
and 84 respondents chose lotteries C and D, respectively (18.32% and 12.82% of the total,
respectively). Lotteries B and E were chosen by 64 and 53 subjects, respectively (9.77%
and 8.09% respectively).
Table 8 reports the responses to the SOEP tasks for the 629 subjects who answered
the task in IP6. The mode of the distribution of the responses has a willingness to take
risk equal to 5, in general, and equal to 2 in finance and health. The average willingness
to take risk was 4.52 in SOEP-G, 3.17 in SOEP-F, and 3.15 in SOEP-H. Appendix G
reports analogous information for the responses in IP7, and for the subsample of subjects
who participated to the risk preferences module in both IP6 and IP7.
5.3 Correlations
In preparation of our discussion on the cross-validity of the three risk preferences measures
at an individual level, we present the aggregate figures for pairwise correlations between
the B-EG and HL measures of risk aversion and the SOEP risk attitudes measures. As
described above, B-EG RA is an increasing measure of risk aversion according to the B-
EG task, taking value 1 (very risk seeking) if the subject chooses lottery F (the riskiest
gamble) in the B-EG task, to value 6 (very risk averse) if the subject chooses lottery A
(the certain gamble) in the B-EG task. Similarly, HL RA is an increasing measure of risk
aversion according to the HL task, in terms of the point in which the subject switches
for the first time from lottery A to lottery B in the sequence of HL questions, from 1
(choosing for the first time the riskier lottery B when p = 0.1) to 10 (never choosing the
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riskier lottery B). Finally the SOEP-G RA is a decreasing measure of risk taking attitude
according to the SOEP-G task, taking value 1 (very willing to take risks) if the subject
chooses 10 in the SOEP-G Likert scale (“I am generally a person fully prepared to take
risks”), to 10 (unwilling to take risks) if the subject chooses 0 in the SOEP-G Likert
scale (“I am generally a person unwilling to take risks”), with the equivalent meaning for
SOEP-F and SOEP-H. It is expected therefore that the pairwise correlations between the
B-EG RA, HL RA and SOEP RA measures are all positive.
Table 9 reports the Pearson cross-methods pairwise correlations with sampling weights
between the different measures of risk aversion, together with their significance levels, at
IP6 (top half) and IP7 (bottom half).11 In both waves the HL measures of risk aversion
with low monetary stakes are strongly and significantly positively correlated with the HL
measure of risk aversion with high monetary stakes: the correlation is 0.669 (p < 0.001)
in IP6, and 0.627 (p < 0.001) in IP7.
The HL measures of risk aversion, with both low and high stakes, are also significantly
correlated with the B-EG measure of risk aversion, although the correlation is generally
low (0.120, p < 0.001, and 0.129, p < 0.001, between responses in B-EG and HL choices
with low stakes in IP6 and IP7, respectively; 0.172, p < 0.001, and 0.169, p < 0.001,
between responses in B-EG and HL choices with high stakes in IP6 and IP7, respectively).
The finding of a significant but low correlation between B-EG and HL measures in our
UK representative sample is generally in line with the evidence of no to low correlations
from the previous literature (Dave et al., 2010; Reynaud and Couture, 2012; Deck et al.,
2013; Loomes and Pogrebna, 2014).12
In both IP6 and IP7, responses to the three self-reported SOEP risk attitude measures
are highly and significantly correlated among them: 0.621 and 0.4989 between SOEP-G
and SOEP-F in IP6 and IP7, respectively; 0.531 and 0.420 between SOEP-G and SOEP-H
in IP6 and IP7, respectively; and 0.565 and 0.439 between SOEP-F and SOEP-H in IP6
and IP7, respectively (all with p < 0.001). These highly significant correlations between
the various SOEP measures are in line with what is typically found in the literature
(Dohmen et al., 2011; Falk et al., 2016; Vieider et al., 2015a; Josef et al., 2016): Vieider
et al. (2015a), for instance, find correlations of 0.495 between SOEP-G and SOEP-F, 0.137
between SOEP-G and SOEP-H, and 0.250 between SOEP-F and SOEP-H.
In IP6 the B-EG measure of risk aversion is significantly and positively correlated with
the SOEP risk attitude measures but the correlations are low: 0.095 (p =0.058) with the
SOEP-G, 0.136 (p =0.007) with the SOEP-F, and 0.103 (p =0.015) with the SOEP-H.
In IP7 the B-EG measure of risk aversion is not significantly correlated with any of the
SOEP measures: all correlations are close to zero. This no to low correlation between
11We have also calculated Spearman correlations and polychoric correlations to account for the ordinal
structure of the data. All correlations are substantially similar and are available on request.
12It is also worthwhile to note that the low correlations between the B-EG and the HL measures of risk
aversion in a within-subject experiment like ours could, in principle, be partly explained by some form of
“hedging” across incentive-compatible tasks attempted by risk-seeking subjects, a possibility noticed by
Crosetto and Filippin (2015) who, for this reason, adopt a between-subject design in their experiment.
In our specific experimental design, however, the scope for such “hedging” strategies is realistically quite
limited because subjects knew in advance that either the B-EG question or one of the HL questions would
be randomly selected for real payments.
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the B-EG and the SOEP measures in our UK representative sample is different from a
significant correlation of around 0.30 found by Crosetto and Filippin (2015) in a sample
of students in Germany.
In IP6 there is no significant correlation between SOEP-H and SOEP-F, on the one
hand, and either HL task, on the other hand. There is also no significant correlation
between the SOEP-G and the HL measures with low monetary stakes. There is positive
significant but very low correlation between the SOEP-G and the HL measures with high
monetary stakes: 0.014, p =0.013. In IP7 there is virtually no significant correlation be-
tween SOEP and HL measures: four out of six pairwise correlations are negative, including
a marginally significant correlation between the HL measure with high monetary stakes
and the SOEP-H measure (-0.125, p =0.052). This substantial lack of correlation between
the HL and the SOEP measures in our UK representative sample is in contrast with the
small but significant associations found by Dohmen et al. (2011) and Josef et al. (2016)
in representative samples of the German population, and with the associations found by
Attanasi et al. (2016) and Falk et al. (2016) in student samples in Italy and Germany,
respectively, but is consistent with the lack of correlation found by Vieider et al. (2015a)
in a student sample in the UK (as well as in other 13 out of 30 countries) ), and by Szrek
et al. (2012) and Charness and Viceisza (2015) in convenience samples in South Africa and
Senegal, respectively. It is also generally in line with the weak and marginally significant
correlations also found by Wo¨lbert and Riedl (2013) and Crosetto and Filippin (2015) in
student samples in the Netherlands and Germany, respectively.
Table 10 reports the cross-waves pairwise correlations, together with their significance
levels, for the B-EG and HL measures (top half) and the SOEP measures (bottom half)
for the subjects for which we have responses in both waves. Table 10 confirms that the
main results discussed above hold for the subset of subjects for whom B-EG, HL, and
SOEP measures can be linked across waves, namely: that the choices are significantly and
highly positively correlated among HL questions with low and high monetary stakes (0.694
and 0.609 in IP6 and IP7, respectively, both with p < 0.001); and that the responses are
significantly positive, but moderately, correlated between the B-EG and the HL task (for
the HL task with low monetary stakes, 0.061, p = 0.357, and 0.196, p = 0.009, in IP6 and
IP7, respectively; for the HL task with high monetary stakes, 0.131, p = 0.01, and 0.139,
p = 0.034, in IP6 and IP7, respectively).
Moreover, there are significant and positive correlations of the B-EG and HL measures
of risk aversion and between the SOEP measures of risk attitudes across the two waves:
the IP6-IP7 correlation is 0.138 for B-EG RA (p =0.028), 0.225 for HL RA with low stakes
(p =0.003), 0.219 for HL RA with high stakes, 0.551 for the SOEP-G RA (p <0.001), 0.473
for the SOEP-F RA (p <0.001), and 0.447 for SOEP-H RA (p <0.001). The evidence of
significant positive correlation over time for the HL measures is generally in line with
the findings of Harrison et al. (2005b) and Andersen et al. (2008b). The evidence of
significant correlation of the SOEP measures over time in our UK representative sample
is closely in line with what found in Germany by Josef et al. (2016) using repeated waves
of the GSOEP: for example, Josef et al. (2016) find correlations in the 0.45-0.53 range for
the SOEP-G, in the 0.42-0.50 range for the SOEP-F, and in the 0.38-0.45 range for the
SOEP-H.
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5.4 Cross validity
We now look at individual responses at one point in time (IP6) and explore how the B-EG
and HL measures for risk aversion and the SOEP risk attitudes measures relate to each
other. We start presenting the main within-subjects raw responses across each pair of risk
preferences tasks: between the B-EG and the SOEP tasks (5.4.1); between the HL and the
SOEP tasks (5.4.2); and between the B-EG and the HL tasks (5.4.3). We then estimate
the CRRA values associated to each specific lottery choice in the B-EG and to each specific
switching point in the HL task, using interval regressions (5.4.4). We next conduct a set
of cross-validity ordered probit regressions, where the dependent variables are the SOEP
measures of risk attitudes and the main explanatory variables are the CRRA values for
the B-EG and HL tasks, estimated by the above interval regressions (5.4.5). We finally
run a set of cross-validity interval regressions where the dependent variable is the CRRA
value conditional to the lottery choice in the B-EG task - estimated by interval regressions
- as a function of the SOEP measure of risk attitudes, and of the CRRA values conditional
to the specific switching points in the HL task - also estimated by interval regressions - or
where the dependent variable is the CRRA value conditional to the switching point in the
HL task - estimated by interval regressions - as a function of the SOEP measure of risk
attitudes, and of the CRRA values conditional to the specific lottery choice in the B-EG
task - also estimated by interval regressions (5.4.6).
5.4.1 Responses across B-EG and SOEP tasks
Responses to the B-EG and the SOEP task can be directly compared for all respondents
who answered both tasks either in IP6 or in IP7. In IP6 a total of 600, 599, and 600
subjects answered both the B-EG and the SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and SOEP-H questions,
respectively. A total of 429 subjects answered the B-EG, SOEP-G, and SOEP-F in IP7,
and 430 subjects answered the B-EG and the SOEP-H in IP7. Tables 17-19 report the
whole distribution of the responses to the B-EG task and to the SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and
SOEP-H questions in IP6 and in IP7. For each value of the self-reported SOEP measure
of risk attitudes (the rows of the tables), each cell contains the proportion of subjects
in each range of CRRA values associated with the lottery choice in the B-EG task (the
columns of the tables). If there is stability of risk preferences in the cross-validity sense,
one would expect that the subjects who in the SOEP tasks (and especially in the SOEP-F
question) self-report to be unwilling to take risks are also the subjects most likely to pick
the safer lotteries in the B-EG task (e.g. a CRRA between 3.46 and +∞ , corresponding
to the safe lottery).
As it can be seen from Table 18, in IP6 there is an association between lower levels
of self-reported willingness to take risk in finance (SOEP-F) and safer lottery choices
in the B-EG task. For instance, 46.63% who self-reported to be unwilling to take risks
in financial matters picked lottery A as their favorite lottery in the B-EG task. In IP6,
however, the association of responses between the SOEP-F and the B-EG tasks is far from
being perfect. For instance, there are numerous subjects who reported little willingness
to take financial risks in the SOEP-F question but then picked risky lotteries in the B-EG
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task even when they had the option of choosing a safe lottery. More generally, about two
thirds of the subjects who reported low levels of willingness to take financial risks in the
SOEP-F task, also chose lotteries involving some degree of risk. Also in IP7 there is some
general but imperfect pattern of association between lower levels of the willingness to take
risk in the SOEP-F question and the choice of safer lotteries in the B-EG task (Table 18).
Table 17 shows that there is also an imperfect association of responses between the
SOEP-G and the B-EG tasks, both in IP6 and IP7. The imperfect pattern of associations
with the B-EG measure of risk aversion is particularly evident in the responses to the
SOEP-H attitudes question (Table 19).
All in all, the analysis of the within-subject individual responses confirms that the
individual responses show some general patterns of associations between the B-EG task
and the SOEP questions, but those patterns are far from being systematic or perfect,
especially for the willingness to take risks in general and in health. It is also worthwhile to
note that, conceptually, it is difficult to ascertain how much coherence one should expect
to see between the two different measures, given that it is not possible to associate a
specific set of CRRA ranges to the different choices in the SOEP questions.
5.4.2 Responses across HL and SOEP tasks
Responses to the SOEP questions can also be compared to responses to the HL tasks for
all respondents who answered both tasks either in IP6 or in IP7. In IP6 a total of 600,
599, and 600 subjects answered both the HL task with low and high monetary stakes and
to the SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and SOEP-H questions, respectively. In IP7 a total of 431, 430,
and 430 subjects answered both the HL tasks (with low and high monetary stakes) and
to the SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and SOEP-H questions, respectively.13 Tables 20-22 report the
whole distribution of the responses to the HL measure of risk aversion with low and high
monetary stakes and to the SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and SOEP-H risk attitude in IP6. Tables
23-25 report the same distributions for the consistent subjects, who never “switch back”
in IP6. For each value of the self-reported willingness to take risk according to the SOEP
measure of risk attitudes (the rows of the tables), each cell contains the proportion of
subjects in each range of CRRA values associated to the first switching point in the HL
task (the columns of the table). If there is stability of risk preferences in the cross-validity
sense, one would expect that the subjects who in the SOEP tasks (and especially in the
SOEP-F question) self-report to be unwilling to take risks are also the subjects who switch
later to the riskier lottery B in the HL task (i.e. a very risk averse subject should switch
to lottery B when p is very high, or should never switch to lottery B).
As it can be seen from Table 21, in IP6 there is some association between lower levels
of self-reported willingness to take risk in finance (SOEP-F) and the range of CRRA
values associated with the first switching point in the HL tasks. For instance, 28.06%
and 21.90% of the respondents who self-reported to be unwilling to take risks in financial
matters never switched to lottery B in the HL tasks with low and high monetary stakes,
respectively. In IP6, however, the association of responses between the SOEP-F and the
HL tasks is not perfect. More generally, around one half of the subjects who reported low
13Results available upon request.
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willingness to take financial risks in the SOEP-F task, also chose to switch to lottery B
at a point that reveals some degree of risk-seeking in the HL tasks. Also in IP7 there is
some but imperfect association between the SOEP-F and the HL tasks (table available
upon request). Patterns of weak association between the CRRA ranges associated with
the switching points in the HL tasks and the self-reported risk attitudes are also observed
in the responses to the SOEP-G and SOEP-H tasks, in both IP6 (Table 20 and 22) and
IP7 (table available upon request).
The imperfect association between self-reported willingness to take financial risks and
the CRRA ranges associated with the switching points in the HL tasks is also observed
when the analysis focuses on the subsample of the 412 subjects who, in IP6, never switched
back in the HL tasks (Tables 23-25). For the inconsistent subjects there is essentially no
meaningful association between the CRRA ranges associated with the switching points in
the HL tasks and the SOEP-F or SOEP-H (tables also available on request).
In sum, the analysis of the within-subject individual responses confirms what was
already suggested by the weak correlations between the HL and the SOEP measures in
our UK representative sample: the individual responses show some patterns of associations
between the HL and the SOEP tasks, but those patterns are far from being systematic or
perfect, especially for the risk attitudes in general and in health.
5.4.3 Responses across B-EG and HL tasks
Responses to the HL tasks can be finally compared to responses in the B-EG task for
all respondents who answered both tasks in IP6 or IP7. In IP6 a total of 655 and 654
subjects answered both the B-EG task and the HL task with low and high monetary stakes,
respectively. In IP7 a total of 449 and 448 subjects answered the B-EG task and the HL
tasks with low and high monetary stakes, respectively (tables available upon request).
Table 26 reports the whole distribution of the B-EG and HL with low and high monetary
stakes measures of risk aversion in IP6. Table 27 reports the same distribution for the
consistent subjects in IP6. For each value of the B-EG measure of risk aversion (the rows
of the tables), each cell contains the proportion of subjects in each range of the CRRA
values associated with the first switching point (the columns of the tables). If there is
stability of risk preferences in the cross-validity sense, one would expect that the subjects
who in the B-EG task chose the safer lotteries, and in particular the riskless lottery A (a
CRRA between 3.46 and +∞), are also the subjects who switch later to the riskier lottery
B in the HL task (i.e. a very risk averse subject should switch to lottery B when p is very
high, or should never switch to lottery B).
In IP6 there is some but imperfect association between choosing safer lotteries in the
B-EG task and the range of CRRA values associated with the first switching point in the
HL tasks. For instance, 28.66% and 28.57% of the 230 respondents who chose the riskless
lottery A in the B-EG task never switched to lottery B in the HL tasks with low and high
monetary stakes, respectively. There are however also as many as 32.98% and 33.26%
of the subjects who chose the riskless lottery A in the B-EG task but then switched to
the risky lottery B immediately in the HL sequence of pairwise choices with low and high
monetary stakes, respectively. Similarly imperfect patterns of associations of responses to
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the B-EG and HL tasks can be observed in IP7 (table available upon request) or focusing
on the consistent subjects who never switch back (Table 27). In sum, there is some pattern
of association between the responses to the B-EG and the HL tasks, but these patterns
are neither perfect nor systematic.
5.4.4 Estimated CRRA values for the B-EG and HL measures of risk aversion
As discussed above, there is a key issue related to expressing risk aversion simply as a
mere linear function of the first switching point in the series of the HL questions or of
the reverse-coded lottery choice in the B-EG task. The problem is that subjects’ risk
preferences are non-linear functions of the switching points in the HL questions and of the
lottery choice in the B-EG task.
We run a set of interval regressions for the B-EG and the HL tasks, where the dependent
variables are the lower and upper bounds of the CRRA values associated to each switching
point in the HL task and to each lottery choice in the B-EG task. We first run simple
interval regressions for the B-EG task, and for the HL tasks with low and high monetary
payoffs and we report the estimated CRRA values for each task in IP6 for all the subjects
and for the consistent subjects only (Table 28). This allows a direct comparison of the
estimated CRRA across the B-EG and the HL tasks for our UK representative sample.
We then replicate the same interval regressions for each task adding a list of control
variables (Table 29). This allows to directly investigate the association of each observable
characteristic with the estimated CRRA, and to directly compare their sign and magnitude
across the different tasks.
We next estimate the CRRA values conditional to each specific switching point in the
HL task and to each specific lottery choice in the B-EG task, and we use these estimates
for the B-EG and the HL measures of risk aversion in the cross-validity analysis in Sections
5.4.5 and 5.4.6. This allows us to replicate the cross-validity analysis in an ordered probit
or an interval regression framework, and to systematically look at the way the three
measures of risk aversion map into each other when the analysis controls for individual
observed heterogeneity.
As it can be seen from Table 28, the interval regression estimations for all subjects in
IP6 return a CRRA coefficient which is not significantly different from risk neutrality in
the HL measure with high monetary stakes, significantly risk seeking in the HL measure
with low monetary stakes, but significantly risk averse in the B-EG measure. The result
for the HL task with high monetary payoffs is largely due to the high number of subjects
who in the HL task with low monetary stakes choose lottery B in the first question, many
of which then “switch back” to lottery A in the subsequent questions. When looking at
the consistent subjects only, in fact, the interval regression estimations return a CRRA
coefficient which is not significantly different from risk neutrality in both HL measures,
while significantly risk averse in the B-EG measure. The same pattern emerges for the
interval regressions for IP7 (available on request). These results suggest that the two
experimental measures of risk aversion do not perfectly map into each other, a result that
is in line with similar analysis by Loomes and Pogrebna (2014) and Crosetto and Filippin
(2015). Also notice that our findings are in contrast with Dave et al. (2010) who, in a
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general population sample in Canada, find significantly higher risk aversion in the HL
than in the B-EG task. In a companion paper (Galizzi et al., 2016a), we formally test this
specific cross-validity aspect using maximum-likelihood structural estimations.
When a range of observable characteristics are introduced as controls in the interval
regression estimations for the consistent subjects (Table 29), the estimated CRRA co-
efficient is not significantly different from risk neutrality in both HL measures, while it
suggests significant risk aversion according to the B-EG measure. Female respondents and
subjects with lower household per capita income are significantly more risk averse accord-
ing to the B-EG measure, but not to the HL measures, while self-employed respondents
are more risk taking according to the HL measure with high monetary stakes.
5.4.5 Ordered probit regression analysis: do the B-EG and HL measures of
risk aversion predict the SOEP measures?
We next run a set of ordered probit regressions where the dependent variables are the
SOEP risk attitudes measures: SOEP-G RA, for example, is defined as a decreasing mea-
sure of risk taking according to the SOEP-G task, taking value 1 (very willing to take
risk) if the subject chooses 10 in the SOEP-G Likert scale (“I am generally a person fully
prepared to take risks”), to value 10 (unwilling to take risk) if the subject chooses 0 in
the SOEP-G Likert scale (“I am generally a person unwilling to take risks”). SOEP-F
RA and SOEP-H RA are equivalently defined with the corresponding meaning for risk
taking in finance and in health, respectively. In the set of ordered probit regressions the
main explanatory variables are the CRRA values for the B-EG measures of risk aversion
estimated by the interval regressions presented above, or the CRRA values for the HL
measures of risk aversion with high and low monetary stakes estimated by the interval re-
gressions presented above. Table 30 presents the ordered probit estimates for all subjects
and for the consistent subjects only. Tables 31-34 include a set of further controls for indi-
vidual characteristics. All ordered probit estimations allow for the complex survey design
and use appropriate sampling weights to draw valid inference for the adult population in
the UK, and adjust standard errors at strata and PSU levels.
From the ordered probit estimations in Table 30, it can be seen that, alike in the
correlation analysis above, the B-EG measure of risk aversion is significantly and positively
associated with the SOEP risk attitudes measure: the CRRA values estimated from the B-
EG task associate with lower willingness to take risks in general, in finance, and in health.
The associations are statistically significant and stronger when the analysis focuses on the
consistent subjects who never switch back in the HL task.
The estimations for all respondents also show that, alike in the correlation analysis, the
CRRA measure for the HL task with low monetary stakes is not significantly associated
to any of the SOEP risk attitudes measures. Alike in the correlation analysis, the CRRA
measure for the HL task with high monetary stakes is significantly associated with the
SOEP-G measure. When, however, the analysis focuses on the consistent subjects only,
there are significant positive associations between the SOEP-G and the CRRA measures
for the HL tasks with both low and high monetary stakes.
For the consistent subjects, the CRRA measures for the HL tasks with low and high
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monetary stakes also associate marginally significantly with the SOEP-F, while there is
no significant association between the CRRA measures for the HL tasks and the SOEP-H.
The next set of ordered probit regressions include as explanatory variables both the
CRRA measures of risk aversion for the B-EG task and the HL task with low monetary
stakes (Tables 31-32) or for the B-EG task and the HL task with high monetary stakes
(Tables 33-34). This allows to test head-to-head the extent to which the B-EG or the HL
measures of risk aversion are able to predict the SOEP measures. The estimations also
add a further set of control variables in the ordered probit regressions. The regressions
are conducted for all subjects and for the consistent subjects only.
The estimations for all respondents show that the CRRA measure for the B-EG task
does a better job than the CRRA measure for the HL task with low monetary stakes in
predicting the SOEP measures of risk taking, especially in finance and in health (Table 31):
the CRRA values estimated from the B-EG task associate with lower levels of willingness
to take risks in finance, in health, and marginally also in general. The association of the B-
EG measure of risk aversion with the SOEP-G, however, is not robust to the introduction
of further control variables. As discussed above, there is no significant association of the
CRRA measure for the HL task with low monetary stakes with the SOEP-G when all
respondents are considered in the analysis.
The estimations for all respondents also show that the CRRA measure for the HL
task with high monetary stakes does a better job than the CRRA measure for the B-EG
task in predicting the SOEP measures of risk taking in general, and the association is
robust and stronger when the analysis controls for further explanatory variables (Table
31). When the B-EG and the HL CRRA measures are considered together, there is no
significant association of the CRRA measure for the B-EG task with the SOEP-G when
all respondents are considered in the analysis. The CRRA measure for the B-EG task,
however, does a better job than the CRRA measure for the HL task with high monetary
stakes in predicting the SOEP measures of risk taking in finance and to some extent also
in health, and the association with the SOEP-F is robust to the introduction of further
controls in the analysis.
Moreover, the estimations for the consistent subjects only show that the CRRA mea-
sures for the HL task with both high and low monetary stakes do a better job than the
CRRA measure for the B-EG task in predicting the SOEP measures of risk taking in
general, and that and the associations are robust and stronger when the analysis controls
for further explanatory variables (Table 31 and 33). Also for the consistent subjects, the
CRRA measure for the B-EG task does a better job than the CRRA measures for the
HL tasks in predicting the SOEP measures of risk taking in finance and in health, and
the associations with the SOEP-F and SOEP-H are robust to the introduction of further
controls in the analysis.
As for the estimations that include further explanatory variables, three results are to
be noted. First, as mentioned, the introduction of further explanatory variables does not
alter the key cross-measures associations described above. In particular, even controlling
for a broad range of variables and characteristics, the SOEP-G measure is significantly
associated with the CRRA measure for the HL task with high monetary stakes and, for
the consistent subjects, also with the CRRA measure for the HL task with low monetary
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stakes. On the other hand, the SOEP-F and SOEP-H measures are significantly associated
with the CRRA measure for the B-EG task.
Second, age and gender are systematically associated to the SOEP risk attitudes mea-
sures. In all the estimations, older respondents tend to self-report significantly lower
willingness to take risks in general, in finance, and in health, while female respondents
tend to self-report significantly lower willingness to take risks in general and in finance.
This set of results is generally in line with what documented for the SOEP measures by
Josef et al. (2016) in a representative sample of the German population.
Third, for the consistent subjects, there is also an effect of the per-capita household
income on the SOEP measures: consistent respondents with higher levels of per capita
income report higher willingness to take risks in general, in finance, and in health. With
the exception of the SOEP-H, however, the associations are not significant when all the
respondents are considered. This set of results is also in line with what documented for
a representative sample of the German population by Josef et al. (2016) who also do not
find any significant association of income with responses to the SOEP questions.
The finding of a significant association between HL and SOEP risk attitudes measures
for the consistent subjects is generally in line with the findings of Dohmen et al. (2011)
and Falk et al. (2016) who use an incentive-compatible MPL test that imposes consistency
of responses and find that it associates significantly with the responses to the SOEP-G
task in their representative samples of the German population.
The lack of significant association between HL and SOEP-H measures of risk taking
is broadly in line with the evidence that risk-taking could be largely domain-specific: see,
for example, the discussion in Weber et al. (2002), Blais and Weber (2006), and the recent
review of the evidence in Galizzi et al. (2016c).
5.4.6 Interval regression analysis: do the B-EG, HL, and SOEP measures
predict each other?
We next systematically replicate the above cross-validity analysis using interval regres-
sions. In particular, in Table 37 we run a set of cross-validity interval regressions where
the dependent variable is the CRRA value conditional to the lottery choice in the B-EG
task - estimated by the interval regressions illustrated in Section 5.4.4 - as a function of the
SOEP risk attitudes measure, and of the CRRA values conditional to the specific switch-
ing points in the HL tasks - also estimated by the above interval regressions - considered
either separately or together, and with and without the usual list of control variables.
We similarly run corresponding interval regressions cross-validity estimations for the HL
tasks, with low and high monetary stakes (Tables 35 and 36 respectively), where the de-
pendent variable is the CRRA value conditional to the switching point in the HL task
- estimated by interval regressions - as a function of the SOEP risk attitudes measure,
and of the CRRA values conditional to the specific lottery choice in the B-EG task - also
estimated by interval regressions. Our systematic approach allows us to complement the
ordered probit estimations illustrated above to assess the robustness of the cross-validity
associations across the different risk preferences measures.
As it can be seen in Table 37, there are positive significant associations between the
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CRRA measure for the B-EG task and the CRRA measures for the HL tasks with both
low and high monetary stakes. The associations are robust to the introduction of further
control variables, and are stronger for the consistent respondents. There are positive
significant associations also between the CRRA measure for the B-EG task and the SOEP
risk attitude measures. The associations are stronger for the consistent respondents. The
association of the SOEP-G with the CRRA measure for the B-EG task, however, is not
robust to the introduction of further control variables in the interval regressions. As it can
be seen in Tables 35 and 36, and coherently with the findings in Table 37, there are positive
significant associations between the CRRA measures for the HL tasks with both low and
high monetary stakes and the CRRA measure for the B-EG task. The associations are
robust to the introduction of further control variables and are stronger for the consistent
respondents. There is also a positive significant association of the SOEP-G with the CRRA
measure for the HL task with high monetary stakes, which is robust to the introduction
of further controls. The association of the SOEP-G with the CRRA measure for the HL
task with low monetary stakes is only significant for the consistent subjects.
All in all, therefore, the results of the cross-validity interval regressions are in line with
what found in the ordered probit regressions and in the pairwise correlations analysis.
We have also systematically replicated the analysis using a comprehensive set of al-
ternative models and specifications. In particular, it is possible to associate each interval
of CRRA values associated to a switching point in HL - or a lottery choice in B-EG -
to the midpoint of that CRRA interval. The midpoints can be easily calculated for the
closed-end CRRA ranges corresponding to the switching points 2 through 9 in the HL
tasks and to the lottery choices B to E in the B-EG task.
Unlike for the switching points 2 through 9, the first and the last intervals of the CRRA
ranges in the HL tasks (e.g. the one associated to choosing for the first time the riskier
lottery B when p = 0.1 or to never choosing the riskier lottery B in the HL task) are
open-ended. The same holds for the lottery choices A and F in the B-EG task. For the
HL tasks, we have estimated the midpoints of the ranges of the two open-ended intervals
in the HL tasks as the fitted values of the regression of the midpoints as a function of the
switching points:
Midpointi = β0 + β1Switching Pi + β2Switching P
2
i + β3Switching P
3
i + ui
The function is an approximation of an out-of-sample extension of the locally weighted
regression of the midpoints on the switching points (i.e. the “lowess” smoother), as show
in Figure 2.
Similarly, for the B-EG task we have estimated the midpoints of the ranges of the two
open-ended intervals as the fitted values of the regression of the midpoints as a function
of the lottery choices:
Midpointi = β0 + β1Lotteryi + β2Lottery
2
i + β3Lottery
3
i + νi
Also this function is an approximation of an out-of-sample extension of the locally
weighted “smoother” regression of the midpoints on the lottery choices, as show in Figure
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We have then run a set of regressions to replicate the cross-validity regressions using
the corresponding midpoints of the range of the CRRA values for the B-EG and the
HL tasks. In particular, in a set of ordered probit regressions, the dependent variable
are the SOEP risk attitudes measures while the independent variables are the calculated
midpoints of the ranges of the CRRA values associated to the lottery choices in the B-EG
and HL tasks, considered either separately or together. In another set of linear regressions,
the dependent variables are the calculated midpoints of the ranges of the CRRA values
associated to the responses to the B-EG task, while the independent variables are the
SOEP risk attitude measure and the midpoints of the ranges of the CRRA values in the
HL task, considered either separately or together. A third set of linear regressions has been
equivalently conducted with the dependent variables being the midpoints of the ranges
of CRRA values for the HL task. We have also run interval regressions for the CRRA
value conditional to the lottery choice in the B-EG task - estimated by the above interval
regressions - as a function of the SOEP risk attitudes measures and of the midpoint of the
CRRA ranges for the HL task, again considered either separately or together, and similarly
for the interval regressions where the dependent variables are the CRRA measures for the
HL tasks. All sets of regressions have been replicated with and without the usual list of
control variables, and considering either the HL task with low or high monetary stakes. All
estimations allow for the complex survey design, and for the fact that sampling weights for
each subject reflect the adult population in the UK, and adjust standard errors at strata
and PSU level.
We have found the same patterns of significant associations across the interval regres-
sions presented above and this further set of regressions using the midpoints of the CRRA
ranges. The results of these further cross-validity regressions are all available on request.
5.5 Temporal stability
We next look at within-subject responses at two points in time and describe the behavior
of the subsample of subjects who answered the same set of risk preferences questions in
both IP6 and IP7, a year after.
5.5.1 Temporal stability of B-EG responses
A total of 406 subjects responded to the B-EG questions in both IP6 and IP7. For these
subjects, the whole set of choices in IP6 and IP7 is reported in Table 11 where we describe
the entire distribution of the ranges of CRRA values associated to each lottery choice in
the B-EG task in IP6. If individual choices are fully stable across the two waves, one
should expect the proportions along the main diagonal to be 100%.
14We have compared the calculated midpoints of the different ranges of the CRRA with the CRRA
values estimated by interval regressions for the B-EG and HL tasks. As it can be seen from Figures 2-3,
in both the B-EG and the HL task, the midpoints of the ranges overlap with the CRRA values estimated
by interval regressions for the closed intervals. In the left open-ended ranges of the B-EG and HL tasks,
the calculated midpoints overestimate the CRRA values compared to the interval regressions, while they
underestimate the CRRA values in the right open-ended ranges.
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Out of the 409 subjects who responded to the B-EG questions in both IP6 and IP7,
only 29.55% chose the same B-EG lottery option in both waves. This proportion is larger
for the subjects who in IP6 preferred lottery A, the safe lottery (46.3%). The proportion of
temporally stable choices is slightly higher (32.46%) for the sub-sample of 285 respondents
who always made consistent choices in the HL questions in IP6, thus excluding the subjects
who switched back. The overall set of B-EG choices in IP6 and IP7 for all the subjects
and for the subset of subjects consistent in the HL IP6 task is also described in Table 11.
5.5.2 Temporal stability of HL responses
In principle, if individual choices are fully stable across the two waves, one should expect
to see, for each individual, exactly the same series of 18 binary choices in both IP6 and IP7.
This seems realistically a too strong definition of stability across waves. An alternative
is to look at the first point in the sequence of choices where each subject switches from
lottery A to lottery B in the block of 9 HL questions with low monetary stakes, and in the
block of 9 HL questions with high monetary stakes. In the case of the consistent subjects,
this switching point is unique and directly identifies the underlying range of CRRA values,
increasing with risk aversion, giving a precise measure of cross-waves stability.15
A total of 407 subjects responded to the HL lotteries with low monetary stakes in both
IP6 and IP7. For these subjects, Table 12 reports the whole distribution of the ranges of
CRRA values associated with each first switching point in the HL task with low monetary
stakes in IP6 and IP7. If individual choices are fully stable across the two waves, one
should expect again the proportions along the main diagonal to be 100%.
Out of the 407 subjects who responded to the HL questions with low monetary stakes
in both IP6 and IP7, only 29.49% switched for the first time to lottery B in correspondence
of the same point in both waves. The proportion of temporally stable responses is larger
for the subjects who in IP6 chose lottery B immediately (52.96%), or who never switched
to lottery B (37.87%).16
For the HL choices with low monetary stakes there are several cases of local movements
(e.g. 43.56% of the subjects who chose to first switch to lottery B in the second binary
choice in IP6 switched immediately to lottery B in IP7). The proportion of temporally
stable responses is similar (26.83%) for the 282 consistent subjects (Table 12, Panel B).
Analogous results hold for the HL questions with high monetary stakes (Table 13).
Out of the 406 subjects who responded to the HL questions with high monetary stakes in
both IP6 and IP7, only 30.73% switched for the first time to lottery B in correspondence
of the same point in both waves.
15In the case of inconsistent subjects who switch back, clearly this switching point is just the first of
multiple switching points, but it could still be used as a tentative metrics for the stability of responses
across waves.
16Just as a comparison, Hey and Orme (1994) find an average consistency rate of around 75% across
two MPL sessions at a distance of a week to 10 days from each other.
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5.5.3 Temporal stability of SOEP responses
A total of 355 subjects responded to the SOEP-G and SOEP-F questions in both IP6 and
IP7, while 354 subjects also responded to the SOEP-H questions in both waves. For these
subjects, the whole set of choices in IP6 and IP7 is reported in Tables 14-16 where we
describe the entire distribution of the SOEP risk attitudes measures in IP7 for each value
of the SOEP risk attitude measures in IP6.
Out of the 355 subjects who responded to the SOEP-G questions in both IP6 and IP7,
only 24.24% rated their willingness to take risk in general in exactly the same way in both
waves. These proportions are higher when in IP6 the subjects self-reported no willingness
to take risks (28.18%), maximum willingness to take risks (46.5%) or a willingness to
take risks of 5, the midpoint of the scale (40.22%). There is, moreover, a visible pattern
of choices around the main diagonal of the table, with evidence of local movements in
responses from IP6 to IP7. There are some visible patterns of choices at or around the
main diagonal of the tables also in the responses to the SOEP-F and SOEP-H questions.
5.5.4 Interval regression and ordered probit analysis: do the IP6 measures
predict the IP7 measures?
We next systematically replicate the above cross-waves correlational analysis using in-
terval regressions and ordered probit regressions. In particular, in Table 38 we run a
temporal stability interval regressions where the dependent variables are the CRRA inter-
vals associated to the lottery choice in the B-EG task in IP7 as functions of the CRRA
value conditional to the lottery choice in the B-EG task in IP6 estimated by the interval
regressions illustrated in Section 5.4.4.
We similarly run corresponding interval regressions estimations for the temporal sta-
bility of the HL measures, with low and high monetary stakes (Table 39), where the
dependent variables are the CRRA intervals associated to the switching points in the HL
tasks in IP7 as a functions of the CRRA values conditional to the switching points in the
HL tasks in IP6.
We also run a set of ordered probit regressions where the dependent variables are
the SOEP risk attitude measures in IP7 - defined as decreasing measures of risk taking
attitudes in general, in finance, and in health according to the SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and
SOEP-H tasks, respectively, as functions of the corresponding SOEP measures in IP6
(Table 40).
All ordered probit estimations and interval regressions are replicated with the usual
list of control variables, for all subjects and for the consistent subjects only. This set
of ordered probit and interval regressions allows to replicate the temporal stability cor-
relational analysis in a regression framework and to systematically look at whether the
different measures of risk preferences in IP6 can predict the corresponding risk preferences
measures in IP7 when the analysis controls for individual observed heterogeneity.
From the interval regressions estimations in Table 38, it can be seen that, alike in the
correlation analysis above, the B-EG measure of risk aversion in IP6 is significantly and
positively associated with the B-EG measures of risk aversion in IP7 and that the effect is
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robust to the introduction of further control variables and when focusing on the consistent
subjects only. Similarly, the interval regressions estimations in Table 39 show that, alike
in the correlation analysis, the HL measure of risk aversion in IP6 is significantly and
positively associated with the HL measures of risk aversion in IP7 and that the effect is
robust to the introduction of further control variables and when focusing on the consistent
subjects only. Finally, the ordered probit estimations in Table 40 suggest that SOEP
risk attitudes measures in IP6 are significantly associated with the corresponding SOEP
measures in IP7, and the effects are robust to the introduction of further control variables
and when focusing on the consistent subjects only.
5.6 External validity
We then look at the issue of external validity of the three measures of risk preferences. To
do so, we conduct a systematic external validity analysis to predict a range of health and
financial behaviours using ordered probit or linear regression models, as appropriate. The
dependent variables are a set of individual behaviours from the linked UKHLS data which
may be conceptually associated to individual risk preferences. We focus, in particular, on
health and financial behaviours. For health behaviours, we look at the questions about
smoking or not smoking, and about heavy drinking, repeated in both IP6 and IP.
We also conduct wave-specific sets of regressions taking advantage of the fact that in
IP6 we have variables for the BMI, and variables for eating fast food, and for whether
the respondents are regular savers, have a private pension fund, while in IP7 we have
information on consumption of fruit and vegetables, and on the DOSPERT test for domain-
specific hypothetical risk taking situations.
The main explanatory variables are the SOEP risk attitude measures, and the CRRA
values conditional to the specific lottery choice in the B-EG task and to the specific
switching point in the HL task estimated by the above interval regressions.
All the external validity regressions have been replicated using a comprehensive set of
alternative models and specifications using the midpoints of the CRRA ranges instead of
the CRRA values estimated by the interval regressions.17 We have found the same patterns
of significant associations across the further sets of regressions using the midpoints of the
CRRA ranges and the ones using the CRRA values estimated by the interval regressions.
In what follows, therefore, we present the results of the latter estimations, while the results
of the former are all available on request.
As it can be seen from Table 41, none of the B-EG and HL measures of risk aversion
and SOEP risk attitude measures are associated to the respondents’ smoking status in
IP6. In IP7 there is some associations of the SOEP-G and SOEP-H measures with the
smoking status but they become only marginally significant when the analysis controls for
other individual characteristics.
As it can be seen in Table 42, there is a significant and positive association between
the BMI and the CRRA measures for the HL tasks with high monetary stakes and for
17All external validity estimations allow for the complex survey design, and use appropriate sampling
weights to draw valid inference for the adult population in the UK, and adjust standard errors at strata
and PSU levels.
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the B-EG task in IP6: subjects with higher BMI tend to be more risk averse. These
associations are robust to the introduction of control variables in the analysis. There is
no significant association between the BMI and any of the SOEP measures.
As it can be seen in Table 43, none of the B-EG and HL measures of risk aversion and
SOEP risk attitude measures are associated to the respondents’ consumption of fast food
in IP6. The marginally significant effect of the SOEP-G is not robust to the introduction
of control variables in the analysis.
On the other hand, as seen in Table 44, the CRRA measures for the HL task with
high monetary stakes and (marginally) with low monetary stakes are positively and signif-
icantly associated with the regular consumption of fruit and vegetables in IP7, and these
associations are robust to the introduction of control variables in the analysis. The asso-
ciations of the SOEP-F and SOEP-H with fruit and vegetable consumption is not robust
to the introduction of control variables.
At the contrary, the SOEP-G and SOEP-H risk attitudes measures are negatively and
significantly associated with a variable indicating how many times the respondents had
five or more alcoholic drinks in the last four weeks, although the associations are not
robust to the introduction of control variables in the analysis. The CRRA measures for
the B-EG and HL tasks are not associated with the drinking status.
Moving to financial behaviour, as it can be seen in Tables 48 and 49, none of the
B-EG and HL measures of risk aversion, and SOEP risk attitude measures are associated
to whether the respondents regularly save, nor to the composition of the savings between
long term and short term time horizons.
On the other hand, the SOEP-G risk attitude measure is positively and significantly
associated with the log of the respondents’ savings, and the effect is robust to the in-
troduction of control variables in the analysis. Furthermore, as it can be seen in Table
51, the CRRA measure for the B-EG task is negatively significantly associated with the
respondents’ likelihood of having a private pension fund, and the association is robust to
the introduction of controls in the analysis: the subjects who, according to the B-EG task,
are more risk seeking in their lottery choices, are more likely to have a private pension
fund.
Finally, as seen in Tables 52 and 53, all the three SOEP risk attitudes measures are
negatively and significantly associated with the summary scores of hypothetical risk-taking
behaviour in finance and in health as measured by the DOSPERT test, and the associations
are robust to the introduction of control variables in the analysis. There is no significant
association between the DOSPERT scores of risk taking in finance and in health and the
CRRA measures for the B-EG and HL tasks.
The main findings above are replicated when the external validity regressions are con-
ducted focusing on the consistent subjects only (all results available at request). In addi-
tion, there are other significant associations: the BMI is positively significantly associated
with the CRRA measures for both high and low monetary stakes; the smoking status is
marginally negatively significantly associated with the SOEP-G measure; the DOSPERT
score for hypothetical risk-taking in finance is negatively significantly associated with the
SOEP-G and SOEP-F measures, but not with the SOEP-H measure.
The positive association between the HL measure of risk aversion and the BMI is
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in contrast with Anderson and Mellor (2008) who, in a sample of US adults, found a
negative relationship between the HL switching point and a BMI indicator for being
overweight: subjects with higher BMI were less risk averse, although the effect was not
robust to changes in the BMI threshold used to define overweight or obese subjects. The
finding that risk preferences are significantly associated with nutritional behavior, such
as the consumption of fruit and vegetables, is in line with similar findings by Galizzi and
Miraldo (2012) calculating the Healthy Eating Index (HEI) for a sample of UK students.
Moreover, the lack of association between smoking and risk preferences measures adds
to the evidence cumulating from a number of studies that have failed to find significant
correlations between risk preferences and smoking (Yi et al., 2007; Reynolds et al., 2007;
Harrison et al., 2010; Mitchell, 1999; Galizzi and Miraldo, 2012; Szrek et al., 2012; Harrison
et al., 2015a).
6 Inconsistent subjects: a closer look
In the previous sections we have reported the results on the cross-validity and external
validity of the different B-EG and HL measures of risk aversion and SOEP risk attitude
measures for the whole sample of respondents and focusing only on the group of “consis-
tent” subjects who never behave inconsistently in the HL questions.
As described in Section 5.2.1, there is a total of 206 subjects who behaved inconsistently
at least once in the HL questions in IP6, in the sense that they switched back to lottery
A after choosing lottery B at least once in the HL task.
In the above analysis we have pooled all these inconsistent subjects together in the
same group, and we have conservatively excluded them when looking at the choices of the
consistent subjects only. One may wonder, however, whether some more information on
the cross-validity, temporal stability, and external validity of the three measures of risk
aversion can be extracted from at least some of these inconsistent subjects. After all, the
degree to which the behaviour can be considered inconsistent can vary across different
subjects. In this section we give a closer look at these inconsistent subjects and we try
to unpack them in separate “types” according to how much we can plausibly learn from
their behaviour.18
A total of 160 and 126 subjects made at least one inconsistent choice when answering
HL questions with low or high monetary stakes, respectively, in the sense of switching
back to lottery A after having chosen lottery B. Moreover, a total of 80 subjects made at
least one inconsistent choice in both the low and the high monetary stakes HL questions.
Among the 160 subjects who made at least one inconsistent choice when answering HL
questions with low monetary stakes, 113 subjects switched from lottery B back to lottery
A exactly one time, 39 switched back two times, 6 switched back three times, and 2 have
missing values.
Among the 126 subjects who made at least one inconsistent choice when answering HL
questions with high monetary stakes, 85 subjects switched from lottery B back to lottery
18For another study looking in greater detail at the behaviour of inconsistent subjects in the HL task,
see Jacobson and Petrie (2009).
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A exactly one time, 24 switched back two times, 11 switched back three times, 3 switched
back four times, and 3 have missing values.
In what follows, we focus on the inconsistent subjects who in the HL questions with
low monetary stakes (the ones presented first) switched from lottery B back to lottery A
only one time. These subjects can arguably be considered the “least inconsistent” among
all the inconsistent subjects. In particular, three groups of such subjects can be identified.
The first group are all subjects who chose lottery B in the very first HL question
with low monetary stakes but then chose lottery A in all other subsequent HL questions
with low monetary stakes. We call these subjects “learners” as they could have made
a “mistake” in their choices in the first question, but then learned and otherwise made
consistent choices. In particular, there are 14 subjects who chose lottery B in the very first
HL question with low monetary stakes, but then consistently chose lottery A in all other
subsequent HL questions with low monetary stakes. That these 14 subjects are indeed
learning is confirmed by the fact 9 out of these 14 subjects then behave fully consistently
in their choices in the HL questions with high monetary stakes.
The second group are all subjects who always chose lottery A in the HL questions
except at one single question where they chose lottery B but then chose lottery A again
in all subsequent choices. We call these subjects as “trembling hand risk averse” as they
could have made a mistake at one question, but otherwise made consistently risk averse
choices. There are 9 of these trembling hand risk averse subjects in the HL questions with
low monetary stakes. That also these subjects are indeed learning is confirmed by the
fact that 5 of these 9 subjects then behave fully consistently in their choices in the HL
questions with high monetary stakes.
The last group are all subjects who always chose lottery B in the HL questions except
at one single question where they chose lottery A but then chose lottery B again in all
subsequent choices. We call these subjects as “trembling hand risk seeking” as they could
have made a mistake at one question, but otherwise made consistently risk seeking choices.
There are 9 of these trembling hand risk seeking subjects in the HL questions with low
monetary stakes. That also these subjects are indeed learning is confirmed by the fact
that as many as 7 of these 9 subjects then behave fully consistently in their choices in the
HL questions with high monetary stakes.
In what follows, we consider the subjects in the above three groups and we tentatively
treat them as only “locally inconsistent”: these subjects made only one single “mistake”
in the sequence of HL choices with low monetary stakes, but their choices are otherwise
consistent.19
In this section, therefore, we temporarily disregard the “mistake” that these ”locally
inconsistent” subjects could have made in their HL choices, and we tentatively estimate,
using interval regressions, a CRRA measure for their HL task with low monetary stakes
in the same way as we illustrate above for the consistent subjects only.
19One can of course define further potential groups or “types” of inconsistent subjects who could be
plausibly considered as making at least some consistent choices. We have looked into each individual series
of HL choices searching for more learning patterns, but the definition and categorization of further “types”
risks to become more blurred, ad-hoc, and somewhat arbitrary. We have therefore conservatively opted to
consider all remaining subjects as “truly inconsistent” and we have pooled all of them together.
33
In particular, for each of the “learners” subjects, we disregard the “mistake” in the
very first HL questions and we estimate, using interval regressions, a CRRA value based
on the hypothesis that these subjects are otherwise consistently risk averse.
Similarly, for each of the “trembling hand risk averse” and “trembling hand risk seek-
ing” subjects, we disregard the “trembling hand” mistake and we estimate, using interval
regressions, a CRRA value based on the hypothesis that they were otherwise consistently
risk averse and risk seeking, respectively.
We then pool all these “locally inconsistent” subjects together with the “consistent”
ones and we replicate the analysis that we have described above for the consistent subjects
only, in order to see the extent to which results are similar to the ones illustrated for the
sample of the consistent subjects only.
Overall, a total of 37 subjects could be considered “locally inconsistent” according to
the criteria explained above. There are therefore up to 457 subjects in the pooled sample
of consistent and “locally inconsistent” subjects. We next present the cross-validity and
external validity analyses for this pooled sample and we compare the findings with the
corresponding ones presented above for the whole sample and for the subsample of the
consistent respondents.
As it can be seen from Table 54, when the “locally consistent” are pooled together with
the consistent subjects, the ordered probit cross-validity estimations return substantially
the same results as the ones described above. In particular, the CRRA measure for the
HL task with high monetary stakes, but not with low monetary stakes, is significantly
and positively associated with the SOEP-G measure. Moreover, the B-EG measure of
risk aversion is significantly and positively associated with all the three SOEP measures
(Table 55).
Also the interval regressions cross-validity estimations with the “locally consistent”
pooled together with the consistent subjects return substantially the same results as the
ones described above. In particular, there are positive significant associations between the
CRRA measure for the B-EG task and the CRRA measures for the HL tasks with both
and high monetary stakes, and the associations are robust to the introduction of controls
in the analysis (Tables 56-57). There are positive significant associations also between the
CRRA measure for the B-EG task and the SOEP risk attitudes measures. The association
of the SOEP-G with the CRRA measure for the B-EG task, however, is not robust to the
introduction of further control variables in the interval regressions.
Furthermore, the interval regressions cross-validity estimations with the “locally con-
sistent” pooled together with the consistent subjects confirm that, coherently with the
findings above, there are positive significant associations between the CRRA measures for
the HL tasks with both and high monetary stakes and the CRRA measure for the B-EG
task, and that the associations are robust to the introduction of further control variables
(Tables 58-59). Moreover, the SOEP-G and the SOEP-F measures are significantly and
positively associated with the CRRA measure for the HL task with high monetary stakes,
and the associations are robust to the introduction of controls in the analysis. The SOEP-
G measure is only marginally significantly associated with the CRRA measure for the HL
task with low monetary stakes. Analogous temporal stability and external validity esti-
mations provide substantially similar results as the ones discussed above for the sample
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of consistent subjects only (tables available on request).
All in all, therefore, the results of the cross-validity, temporal stability, and external
validity regressions for the pooled sample of consistent and “locally inconsistent” subjects
are in line with the above findings for the consistent subjects only. We have also sys-
tematically replicated the analysis using a comprehensive set of alternative models and
specifications using either the raw responses or the midpoints of the CRRA ranges and
found again substantially identical results (all available on request).
7 Conclusions
Risk preferences are considered a fundamental driver of individual behavior in a broad
array of contexts, including health, social care, education, migration, occupational and
self-employment choices, personal and household finance (Barsky et al., 1997; Gollier,
2001; Bonin et al., 2007; Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2008; Anderson and Mellor, 2008; Guiso
and Paiella, 2008; Bucciol and Miniaci, 2011; Von Gaudecker et al., 2011; Bellemare and
Shearer, 2013; Charness et al., 2013; Sutter et al., 2013). Experimental and behavioral
economists have developed a range of different methods to measure risk preferences, in-
cluding the HL (Holt and Laury, 2002), the B-EG (Binswanger, 1980, 1981; Eckel and
Grossman, 2008), and the SOEP method (Dohmen et al., 2011).
Using a UK nationally representative sample of adult respondents within the Innova-
tion Panel of the UKHLS, we have systematically looked at the stability and validity of
the B-EG and HL experimental measures of risk preferences, and of the SOEP risk atti-
tudes questions along three directions: at a given point in time across different methods
(cross-validity); over time (temporal stability); and in terms of the degree to which they
associate with a range of field behaviors (external validity).
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to look jointly and systematically
at the three validity dimensions of two experimental measures of risk preferences (B-EG
and HL) and three risk attitudes questions (SOEP-G, SOEP-F, and SOEP-H) using a
nationally representative sample. Looking systematically and comprehensively at all the
three validity dimensions together is important because it allows us to draw conclusions on
the overall validity of different risk preferences measures that would otherwise be missed
when looking at each aspect in isolation.
We have three main findings. First, concerning cross-validity, we find evidence that
the different risk preferences measures generally correlate and map into each other, al-
though their associations are not perfect. In particular, the two experimental measures
are correlated to each other; the HL experimental measure with high monetary stakes
is significantly associated with the survey question about self-reported risk attitude in
general but not with the self-reported risk attitudes in the financial and health domains;
the HL experimental measure with low monetary stakes is not correlated with any of
the questions on self-reported risk attitudes; the B-EG experimental measure is instead
significantly associated to all of the survey questions about risk attitudes.
Second, concerning temporal stability, we find that, after one year, less than one third
of the subjects choose the same preferred option in the lottery choices or in the self-
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reported risk attitude scales. Nonetheless, there is a significant and positive correlation
between the risk aversion parameters implicit in the lottery choices in IP6 and IP7, as
well as between the self-reported risk attitudes in the two waves. Overall, the temporal
stability of the risk attitudes question is higher than that of the experimental measures.
Moreover, the parameters of risk aversion implicit in the B-EG and HL lottery choices
in IP6 and the self-reported attitudes in IP6 significantly predict the corresponding risk
aversion parameters and self-reported attitudes in IP7.
Third, we find mixed evidence concerning the external validity of the three risk aversion
measures. In particular, none of the three measures of risk aversion is associated with the
respondents’ smoking status, their consumption of junk food, their likelihood of regularly
saving, or the time horizons of their savings. The two experimental measures significantly
associate with the subjects’ BMI, whereas none of the survey questions do. Only the HL
and B-EG measure predict the regular consumption of fruit and vegetables and whether the
respondents have a private pension fund, respectively; on the other hand, only the survey
questions associate with the DOSPERT scores for risk-taking in hypothetical situations
in finance and in health, and with heavy alcohol drinking.
All in all, the evidence on the overall validity of the three risk preferences measures is
rather mixed. On the one hand, all three measures show strong and significant test-retest
correlations across the two subsequent waves of data collection. Each of the measures,
moreover, seem to significantly associate to some risky behavior in the field: the B-EG
and HL measures associate with having a private pension, the HL with the BMI and the
consumption of fruit and vegetables, while the SOEP measures associate with a range of
hypothetical risk-taking situations in health and finance.
On the other hand, none of the three measures of risk aversion is significantly associated
with variables of key health policy interest such as the respondents’ smoking status or the
consumption of junk food. More generally, with the exception of the BMI, no risky health
behaviour is associated with the B-EG measure of risk aversion, and few of them are
associated with the SOEP measures. The associations of the three risk aversion measures
with financial behaviours are also not systematic. Moreover, the way in which the three
different measures of risk aversion correlate and map into each other is far from being
perfect.
From this perspective, our systematic study with a representative sample of the UK
population adds to the mixed evidence on the cross-validity and external validity of dif-
ferent experimental measures of risk preferences (Isaac and James, 2000; Anderson and
Mellor, 2009; Dave et al., 2010; Reynaud and Couture, 2012; Deck et al., 2013; Dulleck
et al., 2013; Loomes and Pogrebna, 2014; Crosetto and Filippin, 2015; Vieider et al., 2015b;
Attanasi et al., 2016). Caution should thus be in order when using one specific risk prefer-
ences measure to draw conclusions about the various, inevitably multifaceted, dimensions
of individual risk-taking in different contexts, especially for representative samples of the
population that, unlike conventional student subjects, are highly heterogeneous.
At the same time, our longitudinal artefactual field experiment with a representa-
tive sample of the UK population adds to the evidence on the temporal stability of risk
preferences (Andersen et al., 2008a; Harrison and Swarthout, 2014; Josef et al., 2016).
Of course, further research is needed to test whether similar conclusions hold for more
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general models of risk preferences beyond the reference EUT and CRRA cases considered
here (Hey and Orme, 1994; Bruhin et al., 2010; Wakker, 2010); when risk preferences are
structurally estimated jointly with time preferences and using mixtures models (Andersen
et al., 2008b, 2014; Harrison et al., 2009; Conte et al., 2011; Balcombe and Fraser, 2015;
Galizzi et al., 2016b); or when the analysis account for the fact that respondents in a
representative sample like ours integrate experimental prizes within individual-specific
levels of background income (Andersen et al., 2015; Galizzi et al., 2016a).
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Table 3: Choices in the EG task
Payoff Expected Standard CRRA Ranges
Low High Return Deviation Lower bound Upper bound
A 28 28 28 0 -∞ 0
B 24 36 30 8.5 0 0.499
C 20 44 32 17 0.499 0.71
D 16 52 34 25.5 0.71 1.16
E 12 60 36 33.9 1.16 3.46
F 2 70 36 48.1 3.46 +∞
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Table 7: Choices in the EG task
All Subjects CRRA Ranges
Total Fraction Lower bound Upper bound
A 230 35.11 -∞ 0
B 64 9.77 0 0.499
C 120 18.32 0.499 0.71
D 84 12.82 0.71 1.16
E 53 8.09 1.16 3.46
F 104 15.88 3.46 +∞
Total 655
Table 8: Responses to SOEP Questions
General Financial Health
Choice Total Fraction Total Fraction Total Fraction
Missing 26 3.93 27 4.08 26 3.93
Unwilling 22 3.33 68 10.29 84 12.71
1 46 6.96 98 14.83 77 11.65
2 71 10.74 110 16.64 123 18.61
3 86 13.01 84 12.71 89 13.46
4 69 10.44 65 9.83 57 8.62
5 113 17.1 82 12.41 67 10.14
6 50 7.56 28 4.24 37 5.6
7 70 10.59 44 6.66 39 5.9
8 49 7.41 16 2.42 21 3.18
9 11 1.66 3 0.45 2 0.3
Fully Prepared 16 2.42 4 0.61 6 0.91
Total 629 629 628
Notes - 32 respondents were classified as inapplicable.
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Table 9: Cross-methods pairwise correlations in IP6 and IP7
IP6
EG RA HL RA Survey
Low Stakes High Stakes SOEP-G RA SOEP-F RA
HL RA
Low Stakes 0.120
(0.009)
[655]
High Stakes 0.172 0.669
(0.000) (0.000)
[654] [654]
Survey
SOEP-G RA 0.095 0.057 0.014
(0.058) (0.249) (0.013)
[606] [606] [606]
SOEP-F RA 0.136 0.191 0.077 0.621
(0.007) (0.719) (0.190) (0.000)
[605] [605] [605] [608]
SOEP-H RA 0.103 -0.018 -0.00003 0.531 0.565
(0.015) (0.692) (0.999) (0.000) (0.000)
[606] [606] [606] [606] [606]
IP7
EG RA HL RA Survey
Low Stakes High Stakes SOEP-G RA SOEP-F RA
HL RA
Low Stakes 0.129
(0.000)
[467]
High Stakes 0.169 0.627
(0.004) (0.000)
[467] [467]
Survey
SOEP-G RA 0.007 0.055 -0.055
(0.892) (0.359) (0.313)
[433] [433] [433]
SOEP-F RA 0.019 0.0399 -0.007 0.4989
(0.752) (0.558) (0.905) (0.000)
[432] [432] [432] [432]
SOEP-H RA -0.014 -0.056 -0.125 0.420 0.439
(0.825) (0.340) (0.052) (0.000) (0.000)
[432] [432] [432] [432] [432]
Notes - Number of observations in square brackets; p-value in brackets. All correlations computed using sampling
weights. Standard errors account for strata and PSU. All measures are increasing in risk aversion.
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Table 10: Cross-methods pairwise correlations for respondents in both IP6
and IP7
EG RA HL RA
Lotteries IP6 IP7 IP6 IP7
Low Stakes High Stakes Low Stakes
EG RA
IP7 0.138
(0.028)
[407]
HL RA
IP6 Low Stakes 0.061 0.196
(0.357) (0.009)
[407] [407]
IP6 High Stakes 0.131 0.089 0.694
(0.010) (0.198) (0.000)
[407] [407] [407]
IP7 Low Stakes 0.009 0.139 0.225 0.203
(0.893) (0.034) (0.003) (0.007)
[407] [410] [407] [407]
IP7 High Stakes 0.024 0.137 0.224 0.219 0.609
(0.730) (0.043) (0.007) (0.008) (0.000)
[407] [410] [407] [407] [410]
SOEP-G RA SOEP-F RA SOEP-H RA
Survey IP6 IP7 IP6 IP7 IP6
SOEP-G RA IP7 0.551
(0.000)
[367]
SOEP-F RA IP6 0.358
(0.000)
[366]
SOEP-F RA IP7 0.4595 0.473
(0.000) (0.000)
[366] [365]
SOEP-H RA IP6 0.3298 0.262
(0.000) (0.000)
[366] [365]
SOEP-H RA IP7 0.292 0.241 0.447
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
[366] [365] [365]
Notes - Number of observations in square brackets; p-value in brackets. All correlations computed using sampling
weights. Standard errors account for strata and PSU. All measures are increasing in risk aversion.
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Table 28: CRRA estimation
IP6
Interval Regression
All Consistent
HL low RA HL high RA EG RA HL low RA HL high RA EG RA
RA estimate -0.60 -0.12 1.98 0.038 0.13 2.18
(0.12)*** (0.089) (0.14)*** (0.14) (0.11) (0.19)***
Observations 655 655 655 449 449 449
IP7
Interval Regression
All Consistent
HL low RA HL high RA EG RA HL low RA HL high RA EG RA
RA estimate -0.84 -0.18 2.13 -0.038 0.10 2.25
(0.18)*** (0.099)* (0.18)*** (0.22) (0.13) (0.26)***
Observations 467 467 467 280 280 280
Notes - Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All regressions
use sampling weights. Standard errors account for strata and PSU. Controls include: Gender, Age, Marital Status,
Education, Income (ln), Employment Status and Interview mode.
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Table 38: B-EG RA temporal stability across IP6 and IP7 - interval re-
gression
Dependent variable: EG RA IP7, repeated individuals
All Consistent
EG RA estimate IP6 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.17
(0.066)** (0.068)** (0.090)* (0.090)*
Female 0.52 0.97
(0.32) (0.40)**
Age 0.018 0.023
(0.011) (0.015)
Married -0.64 -0.56
(0.37)* (0.51)
A Level -0.16 -0.74
(0.33) (0.42)*
Per Capita Income (ln) 0.41 0.46
(0.34) (0.49)
Self Employed -0.020 0.13
(0.65) (0.92)
Unemployed -0.023 13.8
(1.23) (0.97)***
Employee -0.11 -0.042
(0.43) (0.53)
Web (interview) 0.12 -0.45
(0.39) (0.44)
Constant 1.90 -1.89 2.07 -2.01
(0.22)*** (2.59) (0.30)*** (3.66)
Observations 410 399 287 278
Notes - Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All regressions
use sampling weights. Standard errors account for strata and PSU.
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Figure 2: Estimation of midpoints - HL low stakes (IP6)
Figure 3: Estimation of midpoints - EG RA (IP6)
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B Innovation Panel Wave 6 field procedures and treatments
The sampling of the IP is as follows. Within each of the eleven GORs (with Wales and
Scotland each counted as a single region), sectors were sorted in order of the percentage of
“household heads” (defined as the “household reference persons” responsible for owning
or renting, or who are otherwise responsible for the accommodation) classified as National
Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) categories 1 (“Higher managerial, ad-
ministrative and professional occupations”) and 2 (“Lower managerial, administrative and
professional occupations”), and then divided into three approximately equal-sized bands,
thus creating 33 strata. Within each of those strata, sectors were then sorted in order of
population density. Treating the list of sectors as a single ordered list, a sample of 120
sectors was selected systematically with probability proportional to address count. Using
a fixed interval and a random start, 23 addresses were selected systematically from each
sampled sector, making a total sample of 2,760 addresses from 120 sectors. The IP sample
design is thus described by the sampling stratum, the PSUs, and the design weights. In
the estimations we make use of the survey weights to adjust for differential nonresponse
and to generalize results to the UK population (see Section 3).
The final stage of sampling was carried out in the field by the interviewers. For each
sampled address, the interviewer identified the sample persons. All persons resident in the
sample address at the time the interviewer collected the household grid information for
Wave 1 were defined as sample members. A refinement of this procedure was applied at
the small number of addresses that contained multiple dwellings or households, primarily
to constrain interviewer workloads: if more than three dwellings were found at an address,
or more than three households were found to be resident at a sampled dwelling, three were
selected at random for inclusion using a Kish grid procedure.
All household members aged 16 years or older were eligible for interview. As with the
main Understanding Society survey, all persons resident at the address in Wave 1, including
children, were defined as “original sample members” (OSM) to be followed throughout the
life of the study. In IP Waves 4 and 7, additional 960 and 1,560 new addresses, respectively,
were added as “refreshment samples” (8 and 13 in each of the 120 PSUs, respectively).
The IP5 sample had two components: the original sample members (OSMs) that were
at their fifth wave of data collection, and the members of the Wave 4 refreshment sample,
at their second wave. In Wave 5, households in both samples (n=1,575) were randomly as-
signed within PSUs to one of two treatment groups: face-to-face (F2F) interview, (n=532,
about a third of the sample, of which 168 from the refreshment sample), and web-mode
(WEB) interview, (n=1,043, about two-thirds of the sample, of which 315 from the re-
freshment sample). Because randomization was implemented across PSUs, each sampling
point contained a mix of households in each treatment group. Randomization was at a
household level: all adult members (aged 16 or above) within the household received the
same experimental treatment and any split-off households retained the same experimental
allocation from the previous household. As a result, in Wave 5 a total of n=1,293 IP
respondents were randomly allocated to the WEB group (n=856 OSMs and n=437 from
the refreshment sample) and n=702 to the F2F group (n=459 OSMs and n=243 from the
refreshment sample).
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Wave 6 replicated this random allocation with households receiving the same experi-
mental treatment as in IP5. As a result, in IP6 a total of n=1,337 IP respondents were
randomly allocated to the WEB group (n=910 OSMs and n=427 from the refreshment
sample) and n=686 to the F2F group (n=446 OSMs and n=240 from the refreshment
sample).
The same original random allocation of households to WEB versus F2F treatments
was also carried over in Wave 7. In IP7 a total of n=1,126 IP respondents were randomly
allocated to the WEB group (n=773 OSMs and n=353 from the refreshment sample) and
n=554 to the F2F group (n=364 OSMs and n=190 from the refreshment sample).
Waves 6 and 7 differed from IP5, however, in that it incorporated a “mop-up” of
uncompleted households at the end of the standard fieldwork (see more below).
The F2F group involved standard Understanding Society procedures: each adult mem-
ber was sent an advance letter with the same unconditional incentive (£10), after which
interviewers called to attempt computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) interviews.
In each household one adult member was asked to complete the household grid, which
collects information on who is currently living in the household. Typically the household
grid has a question to identify who is responsible for paying utility bills in the household.
This person or their spouse/partner could then complete the household question-
naire. The household questionnaire is relatively short (around 10 minutes) and collects
household-level information such as housing tenure, rent/mortgage payments, expendi-
tures, utility bills, household consumer durables, and some measures of material depriva-
tion. All household adult members were then asked for an individual interview and to
complete a self-completion questionnaire, which was randomly allocated to be either a
computer-assisted self-interview (CASI) or a paper questionnaire booklet. Young people
aged 10-15 were administered a paper self-completion questionnaire.
Fieldwork procedures for the WEB treatment were as follows: all adult members were
sent an advance letter with a financial incentive, inviting them to take part to the web
interview. The value of the incentives was also subject to some experimental random
allocation. Households in the WEB group were randomly allocated in equal proportions
to either an unconditional £10 incentive (WEB10); or an unconditional £30 incentive
(WEB30); or, finally, an unconditional £10 incentive, plus extra £20 conditional on full-
household completion by web in a two-weeks “web-only” allotted time (WEB10+20).
The advance letter included the URL and a unique user ID which was to be entered
on the welcome online screen. A version of the letter was additionally sent by email
to all adult members for whom an email address was available. For members who, in
previous waves, had indicated that they did not use internet regularly for personal use,
the letter said they would also have the opportunity to do the survey with an interviewer.
Up to the three email reminders were sent at 3-day intervals. Adult members who had
not completed the web interview after the two weeks were sent a reminder by post and
interviewers started visiting them to carry out CAPI interviews. This was the two-week
“web-only” period in which households allocated to the WEB10+20 group could qualify
for the additional £20 incentive.
The first household member to log on to complete the web survey was asked to complete
the household grid. In the web mode the household grid also had a question to identify
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who was responsible for paying bills in the household. This person or their spouse/partner
could then complete the online household questionnaire.
In general, the adult web questionnaire was substantially based on the CAPI version
with some appropriate adaptations, such as incorporating interviewer instructions into
question wording, and making “help” screens more respondent-friendly. The web survey
was not suitable for completion using a smart phone or any other small mobile device.
If a smart phone was used to access the log-on page, the respondent was automatically
directed to a page requesting that they log on from a computer.
The WEB survey remained open throughout all the standard F2F fieldwork period.
Interviewers informed household members in the WEB group that the interview would be
closed approximately one week before the end of the fieldwork. In Waves 6 and 7 (but
not Wave 5) households who had not been surveyed at the end of the standard fieldwork
period, and were not adamant refusals, were contacted again in a “mop-up” stage of
fieldwork.
The type of “mop-up” contact was different across groups. The F2F group was con-
tacted to offer a web interview during the mop-up stage. All individuals were sent a letter
including the URL of the web and their unique user ID which was to be entered on the
welcome online screen. A version of the letter was additionally sent by email to the adult
members for whom an email address was available. Several days later, a telephone inter-
viewer contacted all those respondents for whom phone number was known in order to
remind them of the web questionnaire, and to administer a telephone interview if possible.
In the WEB group, the “mop-up” contact was made by telephone. The telephone
interviewer reminded the household member that they could participate on the web, but
that was also able to administer the interview by telephone (CATI). Cases for which a
telephone number was not known were not contacted again at the mop-up stage.
C Allocation to the risk preferences module
The initial random allocation of households eligible to the risk preferences experimental
module across the two interview modes changed because of the above described two-weeks
“web-only” period and the related “mop-up” procedure. In particular, during that period,
228 of the 528 households originally allocated to the WEB mode (43.2% of the original
WEB eligible households) opted for the F2F mode. In the “mop-up” session, further 11
of the 528 households originally allocated to the WEB mode (2.08% of the original WEB
eligible households) had a telephone interview. Because the experimental module was
impossible to administer in the CATI mode, these 11 subjects therefore lost eligibility
for the experimental module. The same happened to 3 of the 280 households initially
allocated to the F2F mode (1.07% of the original F2F eligible households), who also had a
CATI interview in the “mop-up” session, and therefore lost eligibility for the experimental
module. There were also 6 of the 280 households initially allocated to the F2F mode
(2.14% of the original F2F eligible households) who in the “mop-up” session ended up
completing a web interview instead.
As a result, at the end of the two-week “web-only” period and of the “mop-up” sessions,
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there were n=794 households potentially eligible for the experimental module (the original
808, minus the 14 interviewed in the CATI mode): n=499 of them were in the F2F
interview mode (62.85% of the total), and n=295 in the WEB mode (37.15% of the total).
In each household eligible for the experimental module, one adult respondent in the
household was then randomly selected with a Kish grid of enumerated adults. The random
selection was done to ensure a fair representation of both spouses and, more generally, of
all adults in the household. Only one adult respondent thus answered the risk preferences
questions in each household.
D Preamble to risk preferences module
To guarantee clarity and transparency of the procedure, and to ensure that subjects un-
derstood the consequences of their choices, the risk (and time) preferences module started
with the following instructions preamble:
“We will ask you a set of very brief questions. At the end you will have the
chance to win an amount of money. In each question, you will be presented
with a choice. There are two sets of questions. [· · ·] In the second set questions
you will be asked to decide between types of lottery games that you might
prefer to play. In all these questions, there is no right or wrong answer. We
are interested in what you genuinely prefer.”
At the end of this preamble, respondents were also explicitly asked whether they
intended to continue with the experimental task, or whether they preferred to refuse to
take part in it. A similar outside option was presented before the risk preferences questions
(e.g. some respondents may not be willing to play lottery gambles for personal or religious
reasons).
To guarantee that subjects understood the experimental procedure and were fully
aware of the consequences of their choices, the above instructions preamble further ex-
plained:
“Once you have made all your choices, you could receive a payment. Ten
percent of respondents will be randomly selected to win. There are 91 questions
in this section of the interview in total. If you are selected to receive the
payment, one of the 91 questions will be selected at random, and your payment
will be calculated based on your answer to that question. The highest amount
that you could win is £250. If you are selected to receive the payment, the
payment will be arranged at the end of the interview.”
E Randomized payments administration
Randomized payments were administered by mean of an ad hoc computerized script that
was implemented in both F2F and WEB response modes. In the script, a screen of
instructions reminded subjects that they had “1 in 10 chance to receive a payment.” It
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further explained that “If you are selected to receive the payment, one of the 91 questions
that you just answered will be selected at random, and the payment will be calculated
based on your answer to that question.”
A screen shot then simulated a roll of a ten-faced die to see whether the respondent
was actually selected to receive the monetary payment for real. If not, a screen with a
“Sorry, you have not been selected to receive the payment” message appeared, and the
participant moved on to the final questionnaire, described above. If so, a screen with
a “Congratulation, you have been selected to receive the payment” appeared with the
further explanation that “Let’s now see which question will be selected to calculate the
payment. A number between 1 and 91 will be selected at random to choose the question
for your payment.” Another screen shot followed that simulated a random draw of a ball
from an urn containing 91 numbered balls, one for each risk (and time) preferences task.
The sequence of the next screens then depended on the type of experimental questions
that was randomly extracted. If one of the binary lottery questions was randomly selected
(balls numbered 73 to 90), a screen appeared explaining that the question corresponding to
that number was selected, and reporting the whole wording of the selected question. The
screen also reported which lottery was actually chosen by the respondent. A subsequent
screen simulated a roll of a ten-faced die to see which outcome was selected within the
preferred lottery. Another subsequent screen then summarized what was the outcome of
the preferred lottery and that, at the end of the interview, the professional interviewer
would give the respondent a voucher for the corresponding amount. The procedure was
analogous in case the B-EG risk preferences test was selected (ball numbered 91), with
the only difference that the summary screen after the die-roll summarized whether the
low or high outcome had occurred with the corresponding payment.
F SOEP and DOSPERT Questions
F.1 Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP)
The Socio-Economic Panel questions regarding risk attitudes are presented in separate
frames, as shown in Figures 4-6.
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Figure 4: SOEP General Risk Question
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Figure 5: SOEP Financial Risk Question
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Figure 6: SOEP Health Risk Question
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F.2 Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT)
The Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale questions are presented in separate frames. The
first question is shown in Figure 7. The full set of questions is presented in Table 60.
Figure 7: DOSPERT Question 1
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Table 60: Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale (DOSPERT) Questions
1 Betting a day’s income at the horse races
2 Investing 10% of your annual income in a moderate growth mutual fund
3 Betting a day’s income at a high-stake poker game
4 Investing 5% of your annual income in a very speculative stock
5 Betting a day’s income on the outcome of a sporting event
6 Engaging in unprotected sex
7 Driving a car without wearing a seatbelt
8 Investing 10% of your annual income in a new business venture
9 Riding a motorcycle without a helmet
10 Sunbathing without sunscreen
11 Walking home alone at night in an unsafe area of the town
G Responses in IP7 and across IP6 and IP7
Responses in IP7
Also in IP7 our sample of respondents provided heterogeneous responses in the B-EG task.
More than a third of the 468 subjects who answered the B-EG task in IP7 (n=167, 35.68%
of the respondents) chose certain lottery A in B-EG. The riskiest lottery F was chosen
only by 54 subjects, 11.54% of the total. A total of 101 respondents (21.58%) chose lottery
C.
Also in IP7 there is wide heterogeneity in the responses to the HL task as well. First,
a total of 188 subjects out of 468 (40.17% of the IP7 sample, compared to 31.01% in IP6)
made at least one inconsistent choice in the sense of switching back to lottery A after
having chosen lottery B (32.47% and 23.5% in the low and high stakes questions). There
is a core group of 74 respondents, who made at least one inconsistent choice in both the
low and the high monetary stakes HL questions.
Less than a fifth of the respondents never chose the safer lottery A: 17.09% with low
monetary stakes and 18.38% with high stakes. A roughly equal proportion of subjects
always chose the safer lottery A in all series of choices (16.03% and 21.58% with low and
high stakes, respectively).
Responses across IP6 and IP7
For 413 respondents we are able to link data across the IP6 and IP7 waves. This sub-
sample of IP6 subjects provided responses in the IP6 B-EG task that were partly different
from the responses of the overall IP6 sample. In particular, while more than a third
of those 413 subjects (36.32% of the respondents) chose the certain lottery A, in B-EG
(compared to 35.11% of the whole IP6 sample), only 10.99% of them (compared to 15.88%
of the whole IP6 sample) chose the riskiest lottery F. A total of 91 from those respondents
(22.03%) chose lottery C (compared to 18.32% of the whole IP6 sample).
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A total of 125 of those subjects (30.43% of the total) made at least one inconsistent
choice when answering HL questions in IP6 (in the sense that they switched back), in
line with the analogous proportion in the whole IP6 sample (31.01%). In particular, when
answering HL questions with low monetary stakes, 23.49% of the sample made inconsistent
choices, while 18.16% behaved as switchers with high monetary stakes. There is a core
group of 48 respondents, who made at least one inconsistent choice in both the low and
the high monetary stakes HL questions.
Less than a fifth of the respondents who answered HL questions in both IP6 and IP7
never chose the safer lottery A in IP (16.95% with low monetary stakes, 19.13% with high
stakes). A roughly equal proportion of subjects always chose the safer lottery A in all
series of choices in IP6 (15.98% and 20.82% with low and high stakes, respectively). The
overall distribution of IP6 responses to the HL questions for the subjects who answered
the HL questions in both IP6 and IP7 is thus fairly comparable with the corresponding
distribution for the whole IP6 sample, except for the smaller proportions on the polar
cases of no or all lottery A choices.
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